インドネシアにおける地方分権下での農村開発に関する研究 : 中部ジャワのプルバリンガ県内三つの村を事例に by Sutiyo,
 Doctoral Dissertation 
A Study on Implementation of Decentralized Rural Development in 
Indonesia: Case of Three Villages in Purbalingga District,  
Central Java Province   
 
 
 
 
Sutiyo  
Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation 
Hiroshima University 
 
 
September 2013 
  
A Study on Implementation of Decentralized Rural Development in 
Indonesia: Case of Three Villages in Purbalingga District,  
Central Java Province  
 
 
 
 
D103171 
 
Sutiyo 
A Dissertation Submitted to 
the Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation 
of Hiroshima University in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirement for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
September 2013 
 

i 
 
Acknowledgment 
 
My interest in issues of rural development began shortly after I worked as a local 
officer in one of ward governments in Purbalingga district in 2009. I witnessed many of 
my people had difficulty to obtain food despite bright economic indicators always 
presented by the district government. This phenomenon motivated me to study the 
problems of rural development scientifically. Thanks to the God, I passed screening tests 
of the scholarship from National Planning Agency, and could go to Hiroshima University 
in 2010. 
After about three years studying in Hiroshima University, it is only because of 
Allah, my Almighty God, that I could finish writing my doctoral dissertation. I got 
tremendous supports from my families, especially my wife and my mother, who pray days 
and nights to support me mentally. 
Further, it is only because of guide and professionalism of my supervisor, Prof. 
Keshav Lall Maharjan as well as co-supervisors Prof. Seki Koki, Prof. Togawa Masahiko, 
Prof. Kawai Akinobu, Prof. Yoshida Osamu, and Prof. Deddy Hadi Susilo Arifin, that I 
could build an understanding to finish my study. Advice and constructive critics from 
members of Rural Economic Lab also could not be underestimated. From the three years of 
discussion in Seminar on Cultural Dynamic and Rural Economic class, I could improve my 
presentation skill, research methodology, and more importantly, understanding on issues of 
rural development.  
Living in Japan without mastering local language is quite difficult. Fortunately, I 
have a Japanese friend who always willing to help me. I would like to give special thanks 
to Ikuko Sugihashi and Terumi Yoshihara where I always bothered them for everything 
about Nihongo and Kanji.  
ii 
 
I am indebted to Mr. Imam Khoerun and Mr. Titis Panjer from the district 
government of Purbalingga kindly provided me many secondary data, Mr. Masngud who 
kindly assisted me during fieldwork. I am also indebted to Dr. Slamet Rosyadi, Subhan and 
friends, all are from University of Jenderal Soedirman, who helped me during the data 
collection process.  
Last but not least, I highly appreciated good cooperation of village officers, rural 
institutions heads and all respondents in the study villages, who had given me opportunity 
for interview and focus group discussion. I hope that my research can help to fulfill their 
expectation for a better rural development in Indonesia. 
 
Hiroshima,   August 2013 
 
Sutiyo 
iii 
 
Dedication 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
Contents 
 
Acknowledgment .................................................................................................................... i 
Dedication  ........................................................................................................................... iii 
Contents  ........................................................................................................................... iv 
List of Tables ...................................................................................................................... viii 
List of Figures ....................................................................................................................... ix 
Abstract  ............................................................................................................................ x 
Chapter 1 . Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Background ......................................................................................................... 1 
1.2. Problem Statement .............................................................................................. 5 
1.3. Study Rationale ................................................................................................... 6 
1.4. Research Question .............................................................................................. 8 
1.5. Research Methodology ....................................................................................... 8 
1.5.1. Research Location ........................................................................................... 8 
1.5.2. Method of Data Collection .............................................................................. 9 
1.5.3. Sampling ........................................................................................................ 10 
1.5.4. Method of Data Analysis ............................................................................... 10 
1.5.5. Significance of the Study ............................................................................... 11 
1.5.6. Structure of the Dissertation .......................................................................... 12 
Chapter 2 . Literature Review.............................................................................................. 14 
2.1. Introduction....................................................................................................... 14 
2.2. Theoretical Terrain ........................................................................................... 15 
2.2.1. Concept of Decentralization .......................................................................... 15 
2.2.2. Concept of Social Capital .............................................................................. 17 
v 
 
2.2.3. Concept of Participation ................................................................................ 18 
2.2.4. Concept of Local Capacity ............................................................................ 20 
2.2.5. Concept of Community Leadership ............................................................... 21 
2.2.6. Concept of Rural Development ..................................................................... 23 
2.2.7. Concept of Poverty ........................................................................................ 24 
2.3. Linkage between Decentralization and Rural Development ............................ 25 
2.3.1. Potentiality of Decentralization to Rural Development ................................ 25 
2.3.2. Challenges for Decentralization .................................................................... 26 
2.3.3. Conceptual Framework.................................................................................. 28 
Chapter 3 . Design of Decentralized Rural Development in Indonesia .............................. 29 
3.1. The Tiers of Administration ............................................................................. 29 
3.2. Design of Decentralized System ....................................................................... 31 
3.2.1. Political Decentralization .............................................................................. 31 
3.2.2. Administrative Decentralization .................................................................... 31 
3.2.3. Fiscal Decentralization .................................................................................. 33 
3.3. Village Government in Indonesia ..................................................................... 34 
Chapter 4 . Profile of Research Location and Respondents ................................................ 37 
4.1. Introduction....................................................................................................... 37 
4.2. Purbalingga District .......................................................................................... 37 
4.3. Study Villages of Serang, Kedarpan and Sumilir ............................................. 42 
4.4. Respondents ...................................................................................................... 44 
Chapter 5 . District Budgeting for Rural Development ....................................................... 46 
5.1. Introduction....................................................................................................... 46 
5.2. Legal Framework of Participatory Budgeting .................................................. 47 
5.3. Results .............................................................................................................. 48 
vi 
 
5.3.1. Budget Allocation in Purbalingga District .................................................... 48 
5.3.2. Process of Budget Formulation ..................................................................... 50 
5.4. Discussion ......................................................................................................... 56 
5.5. Conclusions and Policy Implication ................................................................. 57 
Chapter 6 . Social Capital for Decentralized Rural Development ....................................... 59 
6.1. Introduction....................................................................................................... 59 
6.2. Results .............................................................................................................. 60 
6.2.1. Social Capital ................................................................................................. 60 
6.2.2. Utilization of Social Capital .......................................................................... 64 
6.3. Discussion ......................................................................................................... 66 
6.4. Conclusions and Policy Implication ................................................................. 67 
Chapter 7 . Capacity of Village Government in Implementing Decentralized 
Development ..................................................................................................... 68 
7.1. Introduction....................................................................................................... 68 
7.2. The Institutions Covered by this Study ............................................................ 69 
7.3. Results .............................................................................................................. 74 
7.3.1. Socio-Economic Condition of Selected Institutions ...................................... 74 
7.3.2. Assessing the Capacity of Village Government ............................................ 75 
7.3.3. Realization of the Capacity ........................................................................... 83 
7.3.4. Capacity Development for Village Government ........................................... 88 
7.4. Discussion ......................................................................................................... 89 
7.5. Conclusions and Policy Implication ................................................................. 91 
Chapter 8 . Community Participation in the Decentralized Rural Development ................ 92 
8.1. Introduction....................................................................................................... 92 
8.2. Mechanism of Community Participation .......................................................... 93 
vii 
 
8.3. Results .............................................................................................................. 94 
8.3.1. Community Involvement in Planning............................................................ 94 
8.3.2. Community Involvement in Execution.......................................................... 96 
8.3.3. Community Involvement in Evaluation ........................................................ 99 
8.4. Discussion ....................................................................................................... 101 
8.5. Conclusions and Policy Implication ............................................................... 103 
Chapter 9 . Rural Poverty Alleviation during Decentralization ........................................ 104 
9.1. Introduction..................................................................................................... 104 
9.2. Changes in Some Sectors at District Level..................................................... 105 
9.3. Changes in Some Indicators at Village Level................................................. 108 
9.4. Changes in Poverty Indicators at Household Level ........................................ 109 
9.4.1. Programs and Poverty Indicators ................................................................. 109 
9.4.2. Targeting Effectiveness ............................................................................... 112 
9.4.3. Changes in the Socio Economic Condition of Respondents ....................... 114 
9.4.4. Case Studies of Some Selected Respondents ............................................... 116 
9.5. Discussion ....................................................................................................... 120 
9.6. Conclusions and Policy Implication ................................................................ 122 
Chapter 10 . Conclusion and Policy Recommendation ..................................................... 123 
10.1. Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 123 
10.2. Recommendation............................................................................................. 125 
References  ........................................................................................................................ 128 
 
viii 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 3.1.  Distribution of Tasks among Government Levels in Agriculture, 
Infrastructure, Health and Education Sectors ................................................. 32 
Table 4.1.  Profile of Purbalingga District, 2010 ............................................................. 39 
Table 4.2.  Socio-Economic Condition of Selected Villages, 2011 ................................. 43 
Table 4.3.  Profile of the Respondents ............................................................................. 45 
Table 5.1.  Budget of Purbalingga District, 2011 ............................................................. 53 
Table 6.1.  The Organizations Existing in the Study Villages and the Respondent’s 
Membership .................................................................................................... 63 
Table 6.2.  Number of Groups Actively Joined By Respondents .................................... 64 
Table 7.1.  Profile of Village Government ....................................................................... 75 
Table 8.1.  Respondent’s Involvement in Planning .......................................................... 96 
Table 8.2.  Respondent’s Involvement in Program Execution ......................................... 97 
Table 8.3.  Cost of Some Building Materials in Rural Development in Serang, Kedarpan 
and Sumilir, 2010 ........................................................................................... 98 
Table 8.4.  Respondent’s Involvement in Evaluation ...................................................... 99 
Table 9.1.  Change in Village Infrastructure .................................................................. 109 
Table 9.2.  Kinship Relation and Distribution of the Programs ..................................... 114 
Table 9.3.  Change in Some Selected Poverty Indicators, 2000 - 2012 ......................... 116 
ix 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1.1.  Growth of GDP per Capita in Indonesia, 1989-2011 ....................................... 6 
Figure 1.2.  Number of Poor People in Indonesia, 1976 – 2011 ......................................... 6 
Figure 2.1.  Conceptual Framework between Decentralization and Rural Development . 28 
Figure 3.1.  Intergovernmental Structure during New Order ............................................ 30 
Figure 3.2.  Intergovernmental Structure during Decentralized System ........................... 30 
Figure 3.3.  Structure of Village Government ................................................................... 35 
Figure 4.1.  Map of Research Location (not for scaling) ................................................... 38 
Figure 5.1.  Stages of Budgeting Process .......................................................................... 47 
Figure 5.2.  Purbalingga District Budget, 1991-2011 ........................................................ 49 
Figure 6.1.  Understanding of Respondents on the Some Matters Related to 
Decentralization ............................................................................................. 65 
Figure 7.1.  Community Perception on Village Head and Hamlet Head Leadership ........ 76 
Figure 7.2.  Self-Assessment Questionnaire on the Capacity of Village Officer .............. 78 
Figure 7.3.  Community Perception on the Leadership of Neighborhood Heads .............. 80 
Figure 7.4.  Community Perception on the Capacity of Village Parliament ..................... 81 
Figure 7.5.  Villager’s Perception on the Capacity of Village Development Committee . 82 
Figure 9.1.  Irrigation network, production of paddy and the growth of GRDP of 
agriculture sector in Purbalingga district, 1991-2010 .................................. 105 
Figure 9.2.  Road and clan water development in Purbalingga district, 1991-2010 ........ 106 
Figure 9.3.  Health indicators in Purbalingga, 1991-2010 ............................................... 107 
Figure 9.4.  Education indicators in Purbalingga, 1991-2010 ......................................... 108 
Figure 9.5.  Framework to Analyze Program Impact on Poverty Alleviation ................. 111 
 
x 
 
Abstract 
 
Following the fall of New Order regime, Indonesian government launched the 
policy of decentralization in 2001. It transferred power, financial resources as well as 
personnel to district government. Rural development became the responsibility of district 
government, especially to allocate the budget, to implement the program as well as to 
monitor and evaluate. Decentralization laws also mandated rural development based on 
principle of diversity, participatory and community empowerment. 
While the administration has systematically applied decentralized system, several 
macroeconomic indicators shows that decentralization has not completely led to successful 
rural development. GDP growth as well as the decline in poverty rate was getting slower 
under decentralization (BPS, Bappenas, & UNDP, 2001). World Bank (2007), which 
conducts panel data analysis on several development sectors in Indonesia, concludes that 
there is still no clear trend resulted from Indonesian decentralization on the quality of 
public service.  
This study aims to analyze the reasons why Indonesian decentralization has not 
completely created successful rural development. It focuses on district budgeting process, 
community social capital, capacity of village government, community participation and 
impact of decentralization on poverty alleviation. A case study is conducted in Serang, 
Kedarpan and Sumilir villages in Purbalingga district, Central Java province. Data are 
collected through observation, interview, questionnaire and documentary study, and 
analyzed through both qualitative and quantitative approach. Multidisciplinary approaches 
are applied, mainly from the perspective of local politics, public administration and 
economic at village level.  
xi 
 
With regard to the district budgeting, it is found that expenditure for rural 
development in Purbalingga district is low, especially for agriculture and infrastructure 
sector. The transferred financial resources from central government are spent more for 
recurrent expenditure due to the enlargement of civil service and the inefficiency of district 
government agencies. Low willingness of district government to share budget information 
has hindered public participation. In addition, district parliament lacks requisite capacity to 
analyze the budget. Thus, participatory budgeting just becomes the formality where rural 
people still cannot influence the decision making.  
This study finds that social relations within the study villages mainly occur within 
informal institutions. Various types of rural institutions exist and are active in conducting 
periodical meeting and addressing common livelihood problems. However, although social 
capital exists, it is not well utilized to execute decentralization. Village government is still 
monopolized by several formal institutions namely village officers, village parliament and 
village development committee. The informal institutions are given no opportunity to enter 
the village political arena, somehow implying to lack of empowerment to the villagers 
during the implementation of decentralized system. 
Indeed, capacities of village government are good enough. Their members come 
from relatively better human resources within the village, and they have good 
understanding on administration matters, regulations as well as technical skill to implement 
village budget. However, despite these good skills, weak coordination is a major problem 
hampering the realization of capacity to address local problems. Village head is still very 
dominant and blocking the capacity of other institutions. 
With regard to community participation, this study finds that the spirit of 
participatory development mandated by national regulations is deviated by some locally 
made regulations. The existing local regulation in Purbalingga district does not guarantee 
xii 
 
the rights of informal institutions as well as marginal groups to participate in village 
decision making. In general, community is involved more in project execution, but less in 
planning and in evaluation. Involvement in planning is just for deliverance of information, 
and resource mobilization is often coercive. Community has no power to access budget 
report and to hold the village government accountable. Village head is still orientating its 
accountability to district government.  
At district level, decentralized system does not result in significant improvement in 
agriculture sector. In infrastructure, education and health sector, larger part of indicators in 
these sectors was improved though in various degree. At household level, lack of budget for 
rural development makes poverty alleviation programs suffer from under coverage. Program 
of Health Insurance for the Poor (Askeskin) and Program of Poor House Renovation (PPHR) 
are the programs suffering from serious under coverage. Further, some programs distributing 
kinds in hand like program of Rice for the Poor (Raskin) and Program of Woman Saving 
Group (PWSG) suffer from leakage because the kinds are distributed to almost all villagers. 
Under coverage as well as leakage of the programs makes them not able to achieve their 
objective to alleviate poverty. Only rural infrastructure development significantly improves 
respondent’s access to some selected public service.  
To improve the effectiveness of decentralization in rural development, it is strongly 
recommended for the central government to strengthen the legislations on decentralization 
by setting a minimum portion of district budget to be allocated for agriculture and rural 
infrastructure sectors and making compulsory for district governments to share budget 
information and to create clear-cut procedures for selecting village proposals. Further, a 
workload analysis to determine the ideal size of district government agencies as well as the 
number of civil service is strongly recommended, so that the structure of district government 
and their recurrent expenditure can be more efficient.  
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With regard to local capacity, this study recommends the government to deliver a 
capacity development for village parliament and village development committee. The 
content of capacity development should be directed to the personal empowerment of the 
members, so that they can take a more balance position with the village head traditionally 
very dominant in rural areas. Further, hand in hand with the capacity development for village 
government, the government should also empower community by guaranteeing the rights of 
informal institutions as well as the marginal groups in village decision making.  
With regard to the identification of beneficiaries of poverty alleviation programs, the 
central government is expected not to impose centrally set indicators of poor households 
strictly. Rather, it should provide space for application of additional local indictors set by 
rural community and village government. The application of additional local indicators of 
poor households will fulfill the gaps when the central government indicators are not 
successful to identify the eligible households for social protections and other development 
programs.  
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Chapter 1 . Introduction 
 
1.1. Background 
Indonesia is an archipelagic country consisting of about 17,000 islands with 1.9 
million square kilometer of land. It is divided into 33 provinces, 501 districts and 
municipalities, 6,694 sub-districts and 77,468 villages and wards (BPS, 2012). Its vast area 
is inhabited by about three hundreds ethnicities, each with its culture and language. Total 
population in 2011 was about 238 million, which ranked at the fourth largest in the world 
(BPS, 2012). About 60% of population live in Java Island, the only 8% of total land in the 
country. Further, most of economic activities are concentrated in Java and the western 
islands of Indonesia. Thus, Indonesia also has large demographic and economic gaps 
across the regions, especially between Java and outer islands. 
Considering these diversities, there is strong reason to apply decentralized system. 
Therefore, the founding fathers of Indonesia, through the Article 18 of 1945 Constitution1, 
orientated the country toward decentralized system. In the early times of the country, the 
government established several regulations2  trying to build decentralized system based 
principality of “as extensive autonomy as possible (otonomi seluas-luasnya)”.  
However, post-independence wars and persistent political unrest until 1960s had 
made the decentralization could not be completely executed (Matsui, 2003; Palmier, 1960). 
Even, after President Suharto through its New Order regime took the power in 1968, 
localism was blamed to be a threat of national unity. Law 5/1974 on Fundamentals of 
Governance in the Region, which was the main legal framework of local government 
                                                          
1  Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution states: “The division of Indonesian territory into large and small 
regions with their form and governmental structure is regulated by the law by acknowledging the 
national governmental system and the rights of originality and specialness of the regions.” Based on this 
article, especially by highlighting the words of “the rights of originality and specialness of the regions”, 
many believe that the constitution basically orientates the state into a decentralized system 
2  Law 22/1948 on Fundamental of the Local Government, and Law /1957 on Fundamental of the Local 
Government 
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launched by the regime, implicitly presented the ways of thinking of the regime. In the 
provision of Law, article of 1.e clearly stipulated “The principality of as extensive 
autonomy as possible cannot be applied because based on our experience, it has induced an 
idea threatening the integrity of unitary state…’’.  
Further, having no intention to strengthen local government, but in the same time 
realizing that the central government alone would not be able to manage its territory of 
Indonesia, made the regime prefer to apply deconcentration rather than devolution of 
power (Ranis & Stewart, 1994; Smoke & Lewis, 1996; Tinker & Walker, 1973). Applying 
the deconcentration system, Indonesia during the New Order was practically under a 
centralized system. This is because deconcentration was just a task transfer from central 
ministries to their branch offices in the field. These branch offices were formally an 
organization of central government that was still under direct control of central ministries.  
Law 5/1974 designed the intergovernmental system in such a way that the 
government could effectively implement centrally managed programs. All government 
levels, from villages, districts, provinces, to central level, were connected by a command 
line where the lower level was directly accountable to the higher level. To maintain their 
loyalty, all local government heads were positioned as the representatives of central 
government in the regions. Before running for election, they had to pass intensive 
screening from the central government. For effective mobilization of national resources, 
central government directly managed almost all revenue both from natural and taxation 
resources. Moreover, utilization of fiscal transfer to local governments was strictly marked 
by the central government (Ranis & Stewart, 1994; Tinker & Walker, 1973). 
Regardless its intergovernmental arrangement, the rise of New Order regime had 
marked the period when economic development became the main agenda of government. 
Influenced very much by Rostow’s theory on development stages, the regime believed that 
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only through modernization and capital-intensive-programs could the government 
accelerate rural development. Thus, rural development programs were delivered through 
centrally planned projects and vast price subsidies. As the regime also believed that 
political stability was a prerequisite condition for economic growth, the government 
through Law 3/1975 on Political Organization suppressed local civil society and political 
activities.  
The regime successfully delivered many development programs like green 
revolution, rural electrification, transmigration, family planning and other rural 
infrastructure development programs (Barbier, 1989; Manning, 1988; Rock, 2003), which 
created a remarkable achievement in economic development. From 1968 to 1997, per 
capita Gross Domestic Products (GDP) was growing by 7.1% per year averagely, and 
poverty rate was decreased from 60% to 17% of population (BPS et al., 2001). During the 
same period, life expectancy was increased from 41 to 64 years, infant mortality was 
decreased from 159 to 49 per 1,000 births, and illiteracy was decreased from 61% to 14% 
(BPS et al., 2001).  
However, accompanying these achievements, centralization also created many 
negative consequences. Monopolization of natural resources extraction by the central 
government had raised claims of being neglected from local people (Anderson, 1983; 
Erawan, 1999; Matsui, 2003). Top-down development system diminished people 
participation, underestimated the local capacity and made local government heavily 
dependent on the central government (Antlöv, 2000; Evers, 2000; Ranis & Stewart, 1994; 
Smoke & Lewis, 1996). The worst thing, might be, centralization of power induced a 
culture of “as far as the boss happy’’ within bureaucracy and provided a suitable 
environment for the corruption, collusion, nepotism and abuse of power throughout the 
country (Antlöv, 2000; Mcleod, 2000; Rock, 2003; Shah & Thompson, 2004).  
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Nevertheless, in 1998, the Asian monetary crisis hit Indonesia and led to a reform 
movement. Not only did it collapse the regime, but the movement also demanded a more 
democratic government system. To respond the reform, the parliament enacted Law 
22/1999 on Local Government and Law 25/1999 on Fiscal Balance, which directed an 
extensive transfer of tasks, fund and civil service to district governments. The laws also 
mandated that decentralization should have been started at least in 2001. Thus, it was 
observed that just in a short period, Indonesia was able to move rapidly from the years of 
tight central control to a decentralized and autonomous system of local government 
(Hofman & Kaiser, 2002; Rasyid, 2002; USAID, 2000). Just within two years, about two 
million of civil service, 4,172 field offices and 160,000 service facilities could be 
transferred to district and province governments (Hofman & Kaiser, 2002), and about 200 
new technical regulations was enacted (Rasyid, 2002).  
According to Rasyid (2002), who was the Ministry of Regional Autonomy at that 
moment, decentralization and democratization should go hand in hand, and there was no 
democratization without decentralization. Therefore, on the paper, decentralization aimed 
to provide more space for local participation, to foster local democracy and to increase 
public control over the government. Not only did the laws change the intergovernmental 
system, but also the governance at community level. They mandated rural development 
programs based on principles of diversity, participation, genuine autonomy, 
democratization and people’s empowerment. Therefore, the government changed the 
strategy of rural development and poverty alleviation from vast price subsidy and large-
scale development projects to programs directly targeting the poor by emphasizing on the 
principles of community empowerment.  
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1.2. Problem Statement 
From the historical background discussed previously, it can be understood that 
decentralization policy in Indonesia was equal to a process of democratization. 
Nevertheless, besides to facilitate democratization, it is imperative to note that 
decentralization is not an end in itself. Rather, decentralization is only a way to pursue 
economic development. In the different words, wider public involvement in local decision-
making should not only acquire legitimacy and grassroots support, but also lead to a more 
accelerated economic growth and poverty alleviation. In the context of Indonesia where 
about 65% of population as well as poor people live in rural areas, decentralized system 
was expected to accelerate rural development.  
After more than twelve years of the implementation of decentralized system in 
Indonesia, however, some macro-economic indicators show that decentralization has not 
completely achieved its objectives to accelerate economic growth and poverty reduction. 
For example, per capita GDP grew by 4% after decentralized system. This figure is lower 
than under the New Order, when GDP per capita could grow by average 5.2% annually 
(Figure 1.1). Similarly, the number of poor people is still fluctuating, indicating how 
fragile is government achievement in poverty alleviation (Figure 1.2).  
Further, World Bank (2007), in its rigorous evaluation of performance of 
Indonesian decentralization, concludes that there is no clear trend resulted from Indonesian 
decentralized system on quality of public service. Some indicators, like primary school 
enrollment rate, were improved, but many others, like infant and under-five mortality, 
maternal mortality rates, access to water, energy and sanitation services, were only slightly 
improved or even not at all (World Bank, 2007). The following two figures present per 
capita GDP growth and poverty number in Indonesia, before and after decentralization.  
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Figure 1.1. Growth of GDP per Capita in Indonesia, 1989-
2011 
Source: http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indonesia/gdp-per-
capita-growth 
Figure 1.2. Number of Poor People in Indonesia, 1976 – 2011 
Source: BPS et al. (2001), BPS (2012) 
 
 
1.3. Study Rationale 
Conceptually, there is no doubt that decentralization creates successful 
development (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007; Cohen & Peterson, 1997; Parker, 1995). 
According to Cheema and Rondinelli (2007), many failures of decentralization are due to 
problems of implementation rather than the concept of decentralization itself.  
Several studies on the implementation of decentralization have been conducted. 
Most of them find that the hasty preparation of decentralization created many problems 
during policy implementation. World Bank (2003) identifies four major problems 
including unclear distribution of tasks among government level, unequal fiscal transfer, 
low capacity as well as accountability of the district government. The other more specific 
studies also result in relatively similar findings. With regard to the task distribution, Rasyid 
(2002) himself admits that the technical regulations could not be enacted on time due to 
reluctance of some central ministries to loose their power. Brodjonegoro and Shinji (2000), 
who analyze district expenditure, find serious imbalances of district fiscal capacities due to 
different access to natural resources. Hirotsune (2001) and SMERU (2001) find that 
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majority district governments lacked capacity since management of local civil servant 
remained unclear without proper incentive to encourage best performance. Wilson, Djani, 
and Masduki (2009) find that accountability of district government was still low, while 
SMERU (2001) concludes that capacity of local parliament to control district government 
was weak. Further, Hadiz (2004) find that many district government institutions were 
hijacked by wide ranges of political interest accompanying local direct election. Indonesian 
decentralization was also noticed to lead to proliferations of many new local governments, 
which increased spending for administration and personnel (Firman, 2009). 
Although there have been many studies on Indonesian decentralization, most of 
them focus on central and district government level. This is not really surprising because 
the design of decentralization in Indonesia is often understood as if it is only about the 
changed relation between central and district government. Actually, decentralization laws 
in Indonesia go a step lower than district government, which is village government. Many 
studies neglect the fact that to analyze decentralization and development in Indonesia, the 
role of village government cannot be overemphasized. It is the closets government level 
with community where daily interaction between the state and people happening. This 
level of government also holds power to provide the most basic facilities needed to address 
the daily livelihood like rural road, irrigation channel, primary school and village clinics. 
Thus, if decentralization is perceived as a policy to bring the government closer to people 
(World Bank, 1997), village level study will be more able to analyze how community is 
involved in execution of transferred power. Conducting study at village level will also 
provide opportunity to deeply explain the realities at grassroots level, something so far 
missed in the existing studies on Indonesian decentralization.  
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1.4. Research Question 
The general question of this study is “Why has Indonesian decentralization not 
completely created successful rural development?”. To create a more specific research 
questions, this study will apply an approach of policy phases. A policy generally consists 
of three phases, which are formulation, implementation and taking the benefit. The policy 
formulation is always translated into budgeting decision. The implementation of a policy 
will be influenced by socio cultural character of community, capacity of implementer 
agencies, capacity of local people to participate, and interaction between them. The 
benefits of development policy can be seen from its impact on poverty alleviation. Based 
on these policy phases, this study formulates several specific research questions, as 
follows: 
1. Has local budgeting prioritized rural development? 
2. Is community social capital sufficient for decentralization? 
3. Is village government capable to implement decentralization? 
4. Has decentralization facilitated participatory rural development? 
5. What is impact of decentralization on rural poverty alleviation?  
 
1.5. Research Methodology 
1.5.1. Research Location 
The nature of implementation of decentralization in Indonesia can only be 
understood through a case study in the ground level. By assuming that livelihood problems 
are more profound in the poor localities, this study purposively selected poor areas to be 
the study sites. Serang, Kedarpan and Sumilir village in Purbalingga district, Central Java 
Province was purposively selected through several considerations. Firstly, Central Java 
province was purposively selected because it was one of provinces with the highest 
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poverty rate. It was a home of 5,369,160 poor people, from which about 58% lived in rural 
areas (BPS, 2010). Further, within Central Java Province, Purbalingga district was selected 
due to its far distance from urban areas, therefore character of rural areas was still 
dominant. Further, since poverty and needs of development programs are theoretically 
related to ecological condition, one village from the existing agro-climatical areas in the 
district was selected. Serang, Kedarpan and Sumilir village were selected to represent high 
dry, middle dry and low wet areas respectively 
 
1.5.2. Method of Data Collection 
Data of this study include both primary and secondary. Primary data were collected 
through interviews, questionnaires and observations. This study spent three main periods 
of fieldwork to collect primary data. The first fieldwork was from February to March 2011, 
when the author conducted initial data collection by interviews and observation. The 
second fieldwork was from January to February 2012, when the author distributed 
questionnaire and conducted interview and observation again. The third fieldwork was 
from January to February 2013, when the author distributed questionnaire and conducted 
interview and observation for the last time. In-depth interviews were applied mainly to 
some selected officers from district and village governments and some heads of rural 
institutions, and semi-structured interviews were applied to the villagers. Besides 
questionnaire and interview, participant observations were conducted through a direct 
attendance in some village meetings. Information from secondary data like project 
documents, local statistical reports, newspaper and other official documents were collected 
as per need.  
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1.5.3. Sampling  
Respondents of this study consisted district government officers, village 
government officers and villagers. The respondents from the district government officers 
were purposively selected from the key actors in budget formulation and rural development. 
They included the parliament head, officers from local planning agency and officers from 
the sub district offices. The respondents from village government were purposively 
selected from the key actors in the implementation of rural development projects. They 
included village heads, village officers, village parliament, village development committee 
and neighborhood heads.  
Respondents from villagers were selected through cluster and stratified random 
sampling. In each village, households were categorized based on location, gender and 
relative economic status. About 10% of them were then randomly selected. Some 
adjustment in the field was unavoidable due to technical reasons. In 2012, 232 people 
consisting of 113 in Serang, 61 in Kedarpan and 58 in Sumilir were selected. Further, in 
2013, 229 people consisting of 111 in Serang, 60 in Kedarpan and 58 in Sumilir could be 
met again. This study only selected the villagers who had married and been independent 
family by 2001. 
 
1.5.4. Method of Data Analysis 
Data will be analyzed mainly through qualitative approach. In addition, some 
quantitative analysis through scoring and statistical descriptive technique will be 
supplemented. Due to complexity and multidimensionality of decentralization, an 
interdisciplinary approach is required. This study will be a combination of local politics, 
public administration and economic perspective at village level. The perspective of local 
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politics will be applied to analyze budgeting process and community participation in 
program execution. The perspective of public administration will be applied to analyze 
budget structure and capacity of village government. Further, the perspective of economy 
will be used to analyze impact of decentralization on poverty alleviation.  
 
1.5.5. Significance of the Study 
“All politics is local”, a chapter in the book of Moving Out of Poverty (Narayan, 
Pritchett, & Kapoor, 2007) conveys a very important massage that one has to look at local 
realities in order to understand problems at national level. The massage is very relevant to 
those who want to analyze decentralization. It is only micro study at grass root level that 
can analyze whether community-government relations are changed, how community is 
involved in day to day governance activities, and what is impact of decentralized system 
on community livelihood. Especially in Indonesia where village government is the lowest 
level of government and most of the poor live in rural areas, comprehensive evaluation of 
decentralized system strongly requires a village level study. As of author’s understanding, 
this study will be among the pioneering studies on Indonesian decentralization applying 
multidiscipline approaches of local politics, public administration and economy at village 
level  
Up to now, Indonesian decentralized system has not been stable, and the 
government is still working to evaluate it. For example, in 2004, both Law 22/1999 and 
Law 25/1999 were changed to Law 32/2004 on Regional Governance and Law 33/2004 on 
Fiscal Balance between Centre and Regions. Law 32/2004 aimed to make distribution of 
government tasks more clear and to introduce the mechanism of direct election for district 
head and governor. Law 33/2004 aimed to address the imbalance fiscal capacity by 
enlarging the scope of fiscal transfer. Again, the parliament is currently working to 
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evaluate the laws and to formulate a new legal framework of decentralized system3. In this 
regard, this study is expected to result policy recommendations needed for improving legal 
framework of decentralized system in Indonesia, especially those related to village 
governance and rural development. 
 
1.5.6. Structure of the Dissertation 
This dissertation consists of ten chapters with the composition as follows: 
1. Chapter I: Introduction. 
This chapter aims to develop general idea of dissertation by presenting background, 
problem statement, study rationale, research question and objectives, research 
methodology, significance of the study and limitation.  
2. Chapter II: Literature Review 
This chapter contains literature review on theories of decentralization, social capital, 
local capacity, community leadership, participation, rural development and poverty. It 
aims to develop a conceptual framework of the study 
3. Chapter III: Design of Decentralization in Indonesia 
This chapter analyzes the structure of government level, the design and legal 
framework of decentralization. This chapter aims to provide a general understanding 
about the context of this study. 
4. Chapter IV: Socio Economic Character of Research Location and Respondents 
This chapter presents the monograph of research location and respondents.  
5. Chapter V: District Budgeting for Rural Development 
                                                          
3  By the end of 2011, the Ministry of Home Affairs delivered the draft of revisions of Law 32/2004 and 
Law 33/2004 to parliament, which was supposed to discuss and enact. More detail information can be 
seen in the homepage of Indonesian parliament at  http://www.dpr.go.id/id/uu-dan-ruu/ruu-sedang-
dibahas 
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This chapter will discuss process of budget formulation, budget allocation for rural 
development and socio political realities behind the budgeting. 
6. Chapter VI: Social Capital for Decentralized Rural Development 
This chapter will assess social capital from dimension of institutional membership. 
Further, it will analyze utilization of social capital to execute decentralization and 
respondent understanding on decentralization.  
7. Chapter VII: Capacity of Village Government to Implement Decentralized Rural 
Development 
This chapter will assess capacity of village government to implement decentralized 
rural development and government efforts to develop their capacity. The evaluated 
institutions consist of village head, hamlet head, neighborhood head, village officer, 
village parliament and village development committee. 
8. Chapter VIII: Community Participation in Decentralized Rural Development  
This chapter will discuss community involvement in planning, execution and control 
of development projects.  
9. Chapter IX: Rural Poverty Alleviation during Decentralization 
This chapter aims to analyze targeting effectiveness of some programs implemented 
during decentralized system and their impacts on some indicators of poverty.  
10. Chapter X: Conclusion and Recommendation 
This chapter will draw conclusion and formulate policy recommendation for 
improving decentralized rural development in Indonesia. 
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Chapter 2 . Literature Review 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 Many countries are now applying decentralization, in any forms, to develop rural 
areas. Their decentralization policy may come either from economic or political 
motivation. Economically, decentralization offers a flexible government spending, lower 
cost in public service provision and effective targeting of the beneficiaries. Politically, by 
moving the power of decision making to local level, decentralization offers greater space 
for community participation, accountability and transparency of government institutions. 
The increasing popularity of decentralization often leads to a misunderstanding 
where decentralization is deemed automatically to result in successful development. There 
have been increasing evidences that the link between decentralization and successful rural 
development is not straightforward. Jutting et al. (2005) make a review on implementation 
of decentralization in nine countries, and find that only in West Bengal and Kerala of India 
and Bolivia where decentralization had a positive impact on poverty alleviation. The rest is 
a somewhat positive impact in South Africa, Philippines, Ghana, a mixed impact in 
Uganda and a negative impact in Guinea and Madya Pradesh of India. Their study 
principally finds that the success of decentralization heavily depended on a combination of 
various social, political and cultural factors at local and national level. Similarly, Cheema 
and Rondinelli (2007) find that decentralization is not a panacea for all government 
problems, and suggest that decentralization will be successful only if it is appropriately 
designed and executed by the competent public officials.  
 In order to understand the linkage between decentralization and rural development, 
and in line with the objectives of this study, this chapter aims to analyze theories related to 
decentralization and rural development. This chapter consists of three sections. After 
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introduction, Section 2.2 will discuss theoretical terrains consisting of theory of 
decentralization, participation, local capacity, community leadership, rural development 
and poverty. Further, Section 2.3 will draw a conceptual framework to analyze 
decentralization and rural development.  
 
2.2. Theoretical Terrain 
2.2.1. Concept of Decentralization 
Conyers (1983, p. 97) states that decentralization has been “the latest fashion in 
development administration”. As a model of development administration, it has gained 
vast attention from academicians, development practitioners, international donors and 
governments in many countries. The term of decentralization has been extensively used in 
literatures, through which its meaning evolves from time to time.  
Most of the literatures principally refer to the definition and typology of 
decentralization developed by Rondinelli and Cheema. Their earlier concept was 
developed in 1980s when decentralization was defined as “transfer of planning, decision 
making, or administrative authority from the central government to its field organizations, 
local administrative units, semi-autonomous and parastatal organizations, local government 
or non governmental organization” (D. A. Rondinelli & Cheema, 1983, p. 18). They 
categorized decentralization into three forms, which were: 
1. Deconcentration, which is a distribution of tasks from central ministries to their field 
offices. Although the field offices are located far away from the headquarter, they are 
formally the institution of central government. In deconcentration, the central 
ministries retain decision making while the field offices are only implementer agents; 
2. Delegation, which is a transfer of tasks from central government to the organizations, 
public enterprises or a specific chamber outside of government bureaucracy;  
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3. Devolution, which is a transfer of decision making from central to local government. 
In devolution, local government is autonomous and not a part of central bureaucracy  
 
Those earlier concepts of decentralization came from a circumstance where the 
government was an institution solely formulating and implementing public policy. This 
made the concepts emphasized more on transfer of task within government bureaucracy. 
However, by 1990s, there was widespread idea that government was not exclusive in 
public policy, but there were civil societies, community and market in policy formulation 
and implementation. In this evolving theme of governance, Cheema and Rondinelli (2007) 
categorized decentralization into four types, which were: 
1. Political decentralization, which includes establishment of procedures to improve 
people participation in local political process. Devolution of power to local government 
is equal to the political decentralization; 
2. Administrative decentralization, which include deconcentration of central bureaucracy 
and delegation of government tasks; 
3. Fiscal decentralization, which includes transfer of revenue sharing and expenditure 
discretion to local government; 
4. Market or economic decentralization, which includes liberalization, deregulation and 
privatization.  
 
Clear categorization of decentralization rarely took place in literatures since there is 
clearly an overlap in type and form of decentralization concept. Design of decentralization 
is always a combination of various types, ranging from deconcentration to devolution, by 
focusing either on politic, fiscal or administration. Usually, those applying deconcentration 
are categorized as centralized countries while those applying devolution are categorized as 
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decentralized ones. The most important thing may be that in order to have a comprehensive 
understanding on decentralization policy, multi disciplinary approaches are needed to 
analyze it.  
 
2.2.2. Concept of Social Capital 
Scholars have proposed various definitions of social capital by fundamentally 
highlighting the importance of community network. Bourdieu (1986) defines social capital 
as membership in communities that makes resources, advantages and opportunities 
available to individual. Further, Putnam (1993) defines social capital as features of social 
organization that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.  
Based on types of connections among the group members, Szreter (2002) identifies 
three types of social capital, which are bonding, bridging and linking social capital. 
Bonding social capital refers to connections among people having relatively same 
demographic characteristics. They make a group just to share an identity without expecting 
benefit from it. An example of bonding social capital is a network of relatives within 
people in the same kinship. Bridging social capital refers to connections among people 
having relatively different characters and motivated by benefits offered by groups. An 
example of bridging social capital is membership in a sport group, farmer group, and any 
other institutional memberships. Linking social capital refers to connections among people 
having not only different demographic character, but also power. While bonding and 
bridging social capitals are a horizontal relation among the people, linking social capital is 
a vertical association between less powered people and government or external agencies. 
Literatures are usually vague in extracting the concept of social capital into 
measurable indicators. Indicators of social capital are differently established to serve 
various purposes and contexts. Among various indicators proposed by the literatures, study 
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by Grootaert (1999) shows that institutional membership could be a good indicators to 
measure social capital in developing countries. Institutional membership is measured based 
on several dimensions including density of associations, internal heterogeneity, frequency 
of meeting attendance, members’ effective participation in decision making and payment 
of dues (Grootaert, 1999). 
Literatures have presented evidences on importance of social capital for community 
development programs. Putnam (1993), through his comparative study on localities in 
Italy, finds that development programs were more successful in the northern parts of Italy 
where civic tradition was well developed, compared to the southern part of Italy where 
community had less civic tradition. Study by Putnam (1993) has inspired a general 
understanding that social capital will influence very much on the success of 
decentralization. A robust social capital will produce a dense civil society, which is a 
necessary condition for modern democracy and well functioning political institution 
(Fukuyama, 1999). Putnam (1993) illustrates that relation between social capital and 
economic development is bowling alone. Strong social capital is needed for successful 
community development, and vice versa, successful community development foster social 
capital.  
 
2.2.3. Concept of Participation 
Cohen and Uphoff (1980) identify two main contexts where concept of 
participation is used. The first is political context where participation mainly refers to 
people involvement in political activities like general election and policy formulation. The 
second is developmental context where participation mainly refers to people involvement 
in development programs.  
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In the context of rural development, the concept of participation proposed by Cohen 
and Uphoff might be the most appropriate one. Cohen and Uphoff (1980), by using an 
approach of project cycle, define participation as people involvement in every stage of 
rural development programs, from planning, execution, getting benefits, to evaluation. 
According to them, involvement in planning stage covers activities to identify problems, 
generate idea, assess options and make choice. Involvement in execution stage covers 
activities of cash, labour and material contribution, engagement in project administration 
and enlistment. Involvement in getting benefit covers activities where people take 
advantage of the programs. Last, involvement in evaluation covers activities where people 
evaluate the programs and request the government to accountable for what it has done.  
It is argued that community participation in development stages is interconnected 
each other, and increase in participation in one step has potential to increase participation 
in the other steps (Cohen & Uphoff, 1980; Oakley, 1991). From a political perspective, 
involvements in planning and evaluation are a foundation of participatory development. 
Direct involvement of people, especially in planning and evaluation stages, is better than 
representation system and should be pursued as far as possible (Cohen & Uphoff, 1980; 
Oakley, 1991; Parker, 1995; Paul, 1987).  
Literatures suggest those aiming to analyze community participation on rural 
development programs to be aware about the circumstance where people are involved. 
Either Oakley (1991) or Cohen and Uphoff (1980) strongly advice that rural people in 
many developing countries are usually poor, therefore it should be carefully assessed 
whether community contribution during program execution is a voluntary or coercive 
action. Real participation, according to them, should be a voluntary action, and resource 
mobilization should not exploit the poor.  
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2.2.4. Concept of Local Capacity 
UNDP (2002, p. 8) defines capacity as “the ability to perform functions, solve 
problems, and set and achieve objectives”. Uphoff (1986) argues that concept of capacity 
operates not only at individual level, but also at organization, community, regions and 
national level. He suggests studies aiming to analyze local capacity to narrow the scope 
into an area where residents have a long-standing interaction and emergent collective 
identity.  
One way to understand individual capacity is by using an asset based 
conceptualization of capacity developed by Bebbington (1999). His main idea is that 
assets, which according to Scoones (1998) consist of natural, human, economic or financial 
and social capital, are not just what individual has, but also a source of capacity. 
Bebbington’s main idea is that possession of capital will enable a person to act and to be 
something. Thus, individual capacity can be measured from his access to different types of 
capital and the ways in which individual transforms those capitals to meet the preferred 
objective. Although Bebbington conceptualization is originally created to analyze capacity 
of rural people in addressing livelihood problems, his conceptualization is still applicable 
to analyze capacity for decentralized rural development.  
Although individual capacity is the main source of organizational capacity, most 
literatures agree that the later is not just the sum of the former (Bebbington, 1999; 
Goodman et al., 1998; JICA, 2004; Mizrahi, 2004). JICA (2004) suggests that in addition 
of individual capacity of its member, organizational capacity is also determined by 
leadership, structure of the organization, resources and management strategy. Further, 
capacity at community level is more complex than organizational and institutional 
capacity. As Uphoff (2004) finds, community is often not cohesive and a harmonious 
social entity, but it is divided by various religious and clan separations that may result in a 
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considerable level of local conflict. Therefore, study on community capacity needs to 
discuss not only its resources, but also relationship among various organizations within the 
community.  
Capacity is task specific. Different institutions needs different set of capacity 
indicators. For example, indicators of capacity for village officers will be different from 
those of village parliament as well as village development committee. Similarly, indicators 
of capacity to implement rural development tasks will be different from the indicator of 
capacity to implement the other tasks. Thus, Mizrahi (2004) suggests that in an analytical 
framework, indicators of capacity should be created based on “capacity of whom” and 
“capacity to do what”. 
More often, concept of capacity has been inconsistently used up to the point that it 
overlaps with concept of performance (Goodman et al., 1998; Mizrahi, 2004). Capacity 
and performance are two different concepts. While capacity refers to skill and competence 
belonging to the actor, performance refers to a result of capacity realization. Therefore, one 
should avoid justifying capacity by only looking at performance, and vice versa, should not 
assume that good capacity will always result in good performance. Capacity may exist at 
each actor, but the likelihood that it can be realized to achieve good performance depends 
on many factors, among others are capacity of other actors, social structure that determine 
pattern of relationship among actors, and difficulties of problems that they want to solve 
(Bebbington, Dharmawan, Fahmi, & Guggenheim, 2006; Mizrahi, 2004). 
 
2.2.5. Concept of Community Leadership 
Several studies find that community leaders play substantial role in implementation 
of decentralization. Uphoff, Esman, and Krishna (1998) argue that successful rural 
development programs, although requiring funding, depends more on leadership factor. 
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Community leader can be either a supportive or an obstacle factor for the success of 
decentralization. Study by Takeshi (2006) in Bandung District of Indonesia shows that 
local leaders could improve inclusiveness of decision making by initiating a more open 
mechanism in development planning, somehow making budget utilization more satisfying 
the people. On contrary to the study by Takeshi, Hadiz (2004), through his study in North 
Sumatra regions of Indonesia finds that local leaders themselves hampered decentralization 
by capturing the decentralized resources for their own interest, and by creating a clan 
disaggregation that might create a more complex local conflict.    
Goodman et al. (1998) state that without community leadership, local capacity 
realization as well as capacity development is impossible to occur in rural community. 
Capacity realization and development without community leadership will only create 
disorganization (Goodman et al., 1998). Yet, despite the efforts to understand the linkage 
between community leadership and local capacity, little is known about what kind of 
capacity that a community leader should has. Because community leadership is a very 
location specific, different culture and location needs different leadership style. Therefore, 
capacity needed by a person to become an effective leader in one location may be different 
from the other location.  
In Javanese community, which is the location of this study, rural community is 
traditionally built based on principle of solidarity, but not equality (Mulder, 1996). The 
pattern of relation between rural leader and villagers is traditionally hierarchical by putting 
village head as the highest patron within villages (Antlöv, 1996; Evers, 2000; Mulder, 
1996). Study by Mulder (1996) on concept of Javanese leadership provides very useful 
references to understand what villagers expect from their leader. According to Mulder 
(1996), villagers in Java see their leader as a parent or guardian of community, therefore 
they expect the leader to guide them, to treat fairly, to help them during a difficulty and to 
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protect them during a danger. Ki Hadjar Dewantara, a prominent leader of Taman Siswa 
institution and nationalist movement in 19th century extracts the role of Javanese 
community leader into three popular traditional principles, which are: 1) to provide 
example in the front (ing ngarsa sung tuladha); 2) to inspire from the midst (ing madya 
mangun karsa), and; 3) to encourage from the behind (tut wuri handayani). To provide 
example in the front means to become a paragon of community, to provide clear 
information and guide and to become the first person doing what he said before 
community. To inspire from the midst means to create a new idea or innovation for 
development. To encourage from the behind means to support and encourage communities 
so that they can achieve their objectives (Mulder, 1996; Velsink, 1996). 
 
2.2.6. Concept of Rural Development 
Rural areas can be defined from perspectives of ecology, economy, or political 
administration (Hoggart, 1990; Wiggins & Proctor, 2001). Ecologically, landscape of rural 
areas dominantly consists of field, pasture, forest, river or mountain where rural settlement 
is scattered with relatively minimum physical infrastructure. Economically, having 
relatively abundant natural resources in their areas, most rural people work in farming, 
livestock, forestry, fishing or mining activities. These activities, combined with limited 
availability of infrastructure, imply to a high incidence of poverty in rural areas. While 
rural areas are relatively easier to be recognized from ecological and economic 
perspectives, it is ambiguously defined from political administrative perspective. The 
distinction between rural and urban administration in many countries does not always refer 
to the ecological character. The effort to make clear distinction between rural and urban 
becomes more complex because economic transformation has created peri-urban areas 
where characters of rural and urban are mixed. 
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Rural development is broadly defined as the overall development programs 
conducted in the rural areas. Ellis and Biggs (2001) note that until the 1970s, rural 
development was mainly regarded as agricultural development aiming to increase crop 
production. With the focus on increasing agricultural production, rural development was 
delivered mostly through the Green Revolution (Fernando, 2008).  
The emergence of a more diversified rural economy and the changing view of the 
meaning of development and poverty lead to the change in the concept of rural 
development. Currently, there are at least three main elements found in literatures aiming 
to elaborate the concept of rural development. Firstly, most literatures agree that rural 
development is multi-sectoral programs covering not only agriculture, but also 
infrastructure, micro finance, environment, human resources and so on. Secondly, 
objective of rural development is an improvement of quality of life of villagers, which 
ranges from income, housing, education, health and access to other public services. 
Thirdly, although rural development targets to rural community as a whole, most literatures 
also agree that it should give a priority to the poorest group within rural community (Ellis 
& Biggs, 2001; Fernando, 2008; Singh, 1999; World Bank, 1975).  
 
2.2.7. Concept of Poverty 
Poverty is broadly defined as lack of basic necessities to maintain sufficient 
standard of living (Haughton & Khandker, 2009). In most countries, poverty measurement 
is conducted through the establishment of poverty line, which is a minimum level of 
income needed by a person to obtain minimum calorie intake and other services to live 
properly. World Bank set a poverty line at US$ 2 per day for moderate poverty and US$ 1 
per day for extreme poverty. At the same time, Indonesian government set its own poverty 
line at US$ 1.56 Purchasing Power parity (PPP) per person per day (BPS, 2010). 
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Poverty is a multidimensional issue (Haughton & Khandker, 2009; Ravallion, 
1996). Therefore, a simplified measure based on income alone may not explain fully the 
nature of poverty. Many literatures have proposed methods to measure the 
multidimensionality of poverty, yet according to Ravallion (1996), most of them face both 
methodological and conceptual challenges. Henry, Sharma, Lapenu, and Zeller (2001) 
argue that a relative poverty condition can be described from consumed food, dwelling 
condition, asset ownership, education and expenditure. Although this method is still not 
able to measure the multidimensionality of poverty, it provides a relatively better way to 
identify the poor in a community. 
Rural poverty refers to the poverty phenomena existing in rural areas. Poverty 
alleviation programs principally aim to help the poor meet their basic needs. Alleviating 
rural poverty through improvement of quality of life of the poorest group within village is 
the final objective of rural development as well as decentralization.  
 
2.3. Linkage between Decentralization and Rural Development 
2.3.1. Potentiality of Decentralization to Rural Development 
Arguments in favour of decentralization begin from several hypotheses. Firstly, 
fiscal decentralization provides local governments more discretion to formulate their local 
expenditure. Through a participatory budgeting system, rural people can propose their 
needs to make the budget more pro rural development. By assuming that local 
governments know local problems better than the central government does, 
decentralization is expected to result in a better allocation of development funding (Braun 
& Groat, 2009; Ebdon & Franklin, 2006). One of the examples is the case of Porto Alegree 
in Brazil, a city with about 1.5 million people, which applied participatory budgeting since 
1986, and might be the first local government applying the system in the world. Bhatnagar, 
Rathore, Torres, and Kanungo (2003) find that people involvement in the local budget 
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formulation led to a pro poor budget. From 1986 to 1996, clean water coverage was 
increased from 75% to 98% of households, the number of schools was quadrupled and 
spending for health and education were increased from 13% to 40%. 
Secondly, in political area, as Cheema and Rondinelli (2007) argue, 
decentralization does not only provide more space for people to participate in local leader 
selection, but also in the broader local development context. Decentralized local 
government will provide a maximum feasible participation, which is fundamental for 
successful rural development programs, either through increasing resource mobilization, 
providing mechanism of check and balance, and improving the match between 
development outputs and the need of rural people (Uphoff et al., 1998).  
Thirdly, administrative decentralization promotes institutional approaches in 
poverty alleviation (Braun & Groat, 2009; Cohen & Peterson, 1997). This will improve 
local capacity, quality of public services and effectiveness of identification of program 
beneficiaries. Administrative decentralization will increase government accountability 
since it enables people to monitor their local officers (Braun & Groat, 2009).  
 
2.3.2. Challenges for Decentralization 
There are some challenges for decentralized system to promote rural development. 
Firstly, the effectiveness of fiscal decentralization is determined by the process whereby 
community is involved in local budgeting. Here, it is important to underline results of 
participatory budgeting in many local governments across the world. Despite some 
examples of success story of participatory budgeting, many studies find that budgeting 
process in many developing countries was not community friendly (Andrews & Shah, 
2005). Information gaps and secrecy of document were still major obstacles to make a 
contestable budgeting plan (Andrews & Shah, 2005; PRIA Global Partnership, 2010; 
Wampler, 2008). 
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Secondly, certain local social conditions are needed for the success of 
decentralization. A supportive local condition is reflected from robustness of civic 
traditions, or more specifically, social capital. The main problem is that social capital 
cannot be created immediately, rather, it is a product of long time interaction entrenched in 
the history of community. Thus, before decentralization is implemented, it is important to 
make sure that some level of civic tradition exists within the community. 
Thirdly, there are many concerns that local institutions may have not enough 
capacity. Johnson (2001) states local capacity perhaps has been eroded due to a long 
application of top down development. Similarly, UNDP (2002) concludes that successful 
and sustainable capacity development still cannot be achieved, and despite training of 
thousands people, lack of skills and weak institutions are still the major problem. In the 
context of Indonesia, study by Balisacan, Pernia, and Asra (2003) across 285 districts find 
a huge variation in poverty change and economic growth at district level, somehow 
indicating that district governments had no same capacity to gain the opportunity offered 
by decentralization. If the government does not properly conduct capacity development for 
local institutions, decentralizing rural development to them may only create program 
failure.  
Fourthly, as explained by Uphoff (2004), rural communities are often not a 
cohesive and harmonious social entities, but segmented by various classes. In many 
traditional rural areas, power at local level is more concentrated and more elitist than in 
central level (D. A. Rondinelli & Cheema, 1983). Concentrations of the power will 
inevitably be translated into a political influence in local decision making. In addition, 
Johnson (2001) finds that one’s ability to understand a policy is highly dependent on 
education level. Further, cost of travel, work hours and possible backlash to engage in local 
political process may also discourage the poor to participate. Thus, poverty will have a 
debilitating effect on the ability to participate in decentralization. If the poor do not 
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participate in decision making, they will probably not get the benefits from 
decentralization.  
 
2.3.3. Conceptual Framework 
Decentralization is like a double edge sword for rural development. It has several 
potentialities to create successful development, and at the same time, each potentiality has 
a counter argument of risk that may hamper the development programs. Conceptually, this 
study argues that only if local budget is spent to address the needs of rural people, social 
capital is good, the rural poor actively participates, and local institutions have enough 
capacity, then decentralization will result in successful rural development. Otherwise, if 
local budgeting just becomes a formality, social capital does not exist, the rural poor 
cannot participate and local institutions have not enough capacity, then decentralization 
will be failed. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Conceptual Framework between Decentralization and Rural Development 
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Chapter 3 . Design of Decentralized Rural Development in Indonesia 
 
Decentralization is always a country specific, which means that different countries 
apply different designs of decentralization. In order to be able to follow the discussion 
presented in the subsequent chapters, this chapter will present the general design of 
Indonesian government system underlining in particular those related to village 
government and rural development. This chapter consists of four sections. After 
introduction, the subsequent sections will orderly present administration level, design of 
decentralization from administrative, fiscal and political dimensions and description of 
village government in Indonesia.  
 
3.1. The Tiers of Administration 
The tiers of administration in Indonesia consist of central, provincial, district or 
municipality and village government (Figure 3.1; Figure 3.2). By the end of 2010, there 
were 33 provinces, 497 districts and about 70,611 villages. World Bank (2003) finds that 
the size of Indonesian local governments is considerably larger than the other countries. 
The average population was about 500,000 people per district, and the average width of 
areas was about 4,000 km2 per district (BPS, 2010). There are also wide diversities among 
them. For example, the population of Tambrau district in Papua province was only six 
thousand people while Bogor district in West Java province had five million people (BPS, 
2010). On the other side, the width of areas of Klungkung district in Bali province is 315 
km2 while Merauke district in Papua province covers an area of 44,000 km2 (BPS, 2010).  
District government is the main level of decentralized system. There might be 
several reasons why the government focuses decentralization at district level rather than at 
province or village level. Firstly, focusing decentralization at province level may be 
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regarded to be very close to federal system, somehow different from the mandate of 
constitution to keep Indonesia in a unitary state. Secondly, district government has since 
the Dutch colonial era had an experience to be an autonomous traditional government in 
Indonesia, hence some level of capacity has existed at this level. Thirdly, although the 
principle of subsidiary states that the government authorities should be transferred to the 
lowest level of government as possible, the scope of village government is too narrow to be 
the main level of decentralization.  
Devolution of power implies that local government heads are politically responsible 
only to local parliament. The hierarchical relationship among government levels was 
abolished, except between central government and provincial level (Figure 3.1; Figure 
3.2). Transfer of human resources was done by merging central ministry field offices and 
their civil servants to district governments. 
 
  
Figure 3.1. Intergovernmental Structure during New 
Order 
Figure 3.2. Intergovernmental Structure during 
Decentralized System 
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3.2. Design of Decentralized System  
3.2.1. Political Decentralization 
The policy of decentralization in 2001 changed the local political system. This 
mainly includes efforts to establish an empowered local legislative body. Local parliament 
is now having the power to monitor local government head, to be the main institution for 
which local government head is accountable, and even it can dismiss local government 
head if the later breaks some regulation. It is now playing decisive role in formulating and 
legalizing district budget. With this high power, local parliament is supposed to be an 
effective local legislative body rather than just rubber-stamping institution. Local 
government heads are also now directly elected by community rather than appointed by central 
government. 
 
3.2.2. Administrative Decentralization 
Indonesian decentralized system applies a distribution of tasks among government 
level. Law 32/2004 classified the tasks of government into two categories, which are 
absolute and concurrent tasks. Absolute tasks include foreign policy, defence and security, 
monetary system, judiciary and religion. These are the tasks solely conducted by the 
central government. The rest tasks, which include public works, health, education, culture, 
agriculture, communication, industry, trade, investment, environment, land, cooperation 
and labour, are concurrently conducted by the central, province and district government. 
The role of central government on these concurrent functions is mainly to formulate 
national policy and to establish standardization. The role of province is to supervise and to 
conduct across district coordination. Most of the responsibilities in conducting these 
concurrent tasks belong to district government. Village government receives transfer of 
tasks from district government.  
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Table 3.1 presents the example of distribution of tasks in agriculture, infrastructure, 
health and education, which are several sectors spending the largest portions of 
development expenditure. 
 
Table 3.1.  Distribution of Tasks among Government Levels in Agriculture, Infrastructure, 
Health and Education Sectors 
No Sector 
Government Level 
Centre Province District Village 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Agriculture  - Building dams 
covering areas more 
than 3,000 ha and 
primary irrigation 
network 
- Overcoming plant and 
animal disease at 
national scale 
- Building dams 
covering areas 
between 1,000 
and 3,000 ha 
- Overcoming 
plant and 
animal disease 
at province 
scale 
- Distribution of agriculture 
inputs 
- Extension service, training 
and empowerment of farmer 
groups 
- Building dams covering areas 
less than 1,000 ha and 
secondary and tertiary 
irrigation network 
- Overcoming of plant and 
animal disease at district 
scale 
- Management of extension 
workers 
- Building rural 
small irrigation 
- Developing 
agribusiness 
facilities at 
village level 
2 Infrastructur
e 
- Building strategic and 
national scale 
infrastructures and 
those in metropolitan 
areas 
- Building trans 
province road network 
- Building cross 
district 
infrastructure 
and trans 
district road 
network 
- Building interior and trans 
village road network, rural 
sanitation, clean water, 
housing sector and other rural 
infrastructures 
- Building rural 
roads and 
sanitation and 
other rural 
small scale 
infrastructure 
3 Health - Provisioning drugs, 
vaccine and medicine 
tools 
- Financing free health 
services for the poor 
- Overcoming national 
scale disease 
- Supervisory 
function and 
cross district 
coordination 
- Overcoming 
provincial 
scale disease 
- Management and financing of 
district health service 
providers 
- Building sub district 
polyclinic and district 
hospital 
- Overcoming district scale 
disease, vaccination and the 
improvement of child nutrient 
- Management of health 
workers 
- Building and 
rehabilitation 
of village 
polyclinic 
- Identifying the 
recipient of 
free health 
services for the 
poor 
4 Education - Standardizing curricula 
and national 
examination 
- Financing student 
schooling cost 
- Exclusive 
responsibilities for 
university level and 
religious education 
- Supervisory 
function and 
cross district 
coordination 
- Building and managing of pre 
elementary, elementary, 
lower and higher secondary 
school and non formal 
education 
- Distribution of books and 
educational tools 
- Management of teacher 
- Building and 
rehabilitation 
of pre-
elementary 
schools 
Source: Adopted from Law 32/2004, Government Regulation 38/2007 and Purbalingga 
District Regulation 21/2007 
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3.2.3. Fiscal Decentralization 
In order to support district governments in conducting their new tasks, the central 
government significantly increased fiscal transfer to them. The fiscal transfer consists of a 
general grant distributed based on equalization of population, area and poverty rate, a 
revenue sharing from natural and tax resources, and special grants to perform the programs 
of central government. Fiscal decentralization also establishes a clear calculation of 
revenue sharing between central and local government. For example, the central 
government shares 15% of the oil revenues and 30% of gas revenues for district and 
province producing. From the other mining, fishery and forestry, the central government 
only retains 20% of revenues. In taxation-based revenues, 90% of land and property tax 
and 80% of land acquisition tax are shared to local governments. Article 27 Law 33/2004 
guaranteed that at least 26% of total state revenues should be allocated as fiscal transfer. 
Compared to the portion of fiscal transfer that under centralized system constituted only 
bout 17% of state expenditure, fiscal transfer has since 2001 been the largest part of state 
expenditure, amounting to about 32% in 2011, and about 90% of them are given to district 
rather than to province.  
More important than the increase in quantity is changes in the nature of fiscal 
transfer given to local governments. Previously scattered from various ministries earn-
marked funds, the funds are now unified and transferred through a block grant directly 
from the Ministry of Finance. Fiscal transfer from central government is given only to 
province and district/municipality government, but not to village government. According 
to the regulation, village budget is derived from district government.  
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3.3. Village Government in Indonesia 
In Indonesia, village is the lowest level of government. Administratively, it is 
divided into hamlets, which are group of settlement bordered by natural boundary. Under 
hamlet, there are two levels of neighborhood, which are the upper neighborhood group or 
Rukun Warga (RW), and the lower Neighborhood Groups or Rukun Tetangga (RT). A 
village head directly elected every six years lead the village. He, assisted by a secretary, 
staffs and hamlet heads, stays in the village office to administer development programs, 
issue various letters of reference and deliver other public services.  
Although acknowledged as a government level, the New Order regime did not 
apply power separation between executive and legislative within village. According to Law 
5/1979 on Village, which was the main legal framework of village government at that time, 
village government consisted of a village head and its officers and a village assembly 
named Lembaga Musyawarah Desa (LMD). LMD was an institution to discuss rural 
development programs without any power to control village head. Village head became an 
ex officio LMD head and had a power to appoint members of LMD. The law clearly 
stipulated that village head was structurally under and responsible to sub district head.  
The decentralization policy implemented brought about significant change in 
village government structure. It created power separation by introducing a village 
parliament named Badan Perwakilan Desa (BPD) to replace LMD. It has a power to 
formulate village decree, to approve or to reject village budget and to monitor village head. 
Different from the LMD whose members were appointed by village head, village 
parliament members consist of 5 to 11 people elected by people every 6 years. 
Indeed, village parliament and village head are not the only institution in village 
government. Another important organization is Village Development Committee or 
Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa (LKMD). This is a government-initiated-
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organization introduced in 1980s to coordinate implementation of physical projects in rural 
areas.  
 
 
Figure 3.3. Structure of Village Government 
 
The role of village government in Indonesia cannot be underestimated. For 
example, people always need letter of reference from village office to get an official letter 
from the higher government agencies. Similarly, government agencies and NGO aiming to 
make activities within the village need an official approval from the village office. The 
nature of village as a government level is presented through, among others: an autonomy to 
elect the leader; a power to issue regulation bounding the villagers; tasks to deliver some 
government functions; a power to collect taxes as well as to manage the village budget, and 
more importantly; rights to manage its home affairs.  
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According to the regulation, village government has tasks to build various rural 
infrastructures, to identify the beneficiaries of poverty alleviation programs, to provide 
letter of reference for the villagers, to conduct demographic registration, and to do various 
tasks given by the district government (See Table 3.1). Decentralized system granted 
village government a discretion to plan, to execute and to evaluate development projects 
based on local initiatives. Scheme of rural development programs was changed to 
deliverance of grant where villagers locally decided its utilization. To conduct these tasks, 
village has a budget from a transfer from the district government. Some are automatically 
given based on an equalization of population and area size, some are entrenched to 
development programs delivered in that area, and some should be are requested to district 
through submission of village proposal. Besides these transfers, village government has a 
power to raise internal revenues and to collect some contribution from community. 
Simply speaking, Antlöv (2003, p. 119) states that the regulation appears fairly 
favorable to local democracy. The upper government levels cannot intervene village as far 
as it does not deviance the law. In this connection, Antlöv (2003) regards decentralization 
policy as “a quiet revolution in the countryside”, which did not only provide mechanism 
for check and balance but also revised the old paradigm when rural people just become an 
object of development. 
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Chapter 4 . Profile of Research Location and Respondents 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter will present profile of research location and respondents. It consists of 
three sections presenting the monograph of Purbalingga district, study villages and 
respondents, respectively. In presenting the profile of Purbalingga and study villages, this 
study will discuss geographical, economic and administrative condition. Further, in 
presenting the profile of respondents, this study will discuss education, occupation, 
income, landholding size and access to public services.  
 
4.2. Purbalingga District 
Purbalingga district is located at longitude of 7010' - 7029' South and latitude of 
101011' - 109035' East. Administratively, it has borders with district of Pemalang in the 
north, district of Banjarnegara in the east, and district of Banyumas in the south and west 
(Figure 4.1). The district covers 777.6 km2 of land (BPS Purbalingga, 2012). Most of the 
areas are wet cropland (28%), followed by settlement (24%), dry cropland (22%), forest 
(15%) and other (11%) (BPS Purbalingga, 2012). Topographically, it is located in the 
Valley of Slamet Mountain and Dieng plateau. The northern part of the district is located 
just in the mount foot of Slamet Mountain, which is the highest volcano in Central Java 
province. In the eastern part, most of the areas are the part of Dieng plateau ranges. The 
western and southern parts of the district are relatively low land areas located surrounding 
the streamline of Klawing and Serayu river. The elevation of the district ranges from about 
2,500 m.a.s.l in the Peak of Slamet Mountain to about 50 m.a.s.l in the streamline of 
Klawing River (Figure 4.1).  
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The differences in the topography implies to the differences in the main agriculture 
commodity and economic potentiality within the district. For example, in the northern part, 
most people plant vegetable like carrot, cabbage and potato. In the eastern area, people 
mostly plant cassava, corn and peanut. In the southern and western area, people mostly 
plant paddy. Up to now, agriculture is still the backbone of local economy. It always 
contributes one third of Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) in the last ten years. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Map of Research Location (not for scaling) 
 
Total population in 2011 was about 901,369 people, or about 230,450 households. 
Most of the households (43%) work in agriculture sector, followed by trading (20%), 
industry (17%), service (10%), construction (6%) and other (6%). Up to now, the district is 
still dealing with poverty problem, either in term of income, education, health and 
infrastructure. By 2010, 23% of population had income less than US$ 1.54 PPP per day. 
Moreover, education sector strongly needed improvement. The enrolment rate of primary, 
lower and upper secondary school was 91%, 68% and 31%, respectively. In health sector, 
95% of births were assisted by medical personnel, and life expectancy was 70 years. 
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However, only 43% of households were covered by health insurance. Further, in care of 
rural infrastructure, 65% of the existing road was badly deteriorated (BPS Purbalingga, 
2012). 
 
Table 4.1. Profile of Purbalingga District, 2010 
No Condition Explanation 
1 Geography and ecology    
  a. Astronomical position 7010' - 7029' South, 101011' - 109035' East.  
  b. Area coverage  777.6 km2  
  c. Elevation 50 m.a.s.l. to 2,500 m.a.s.l.  
2 Demography    
  a. Population  851,963 people / 264,747 households  
  1) Agriculture household  43% 
  2) Non agriculture household  57% 
  b. Percentage of poor people  22% 
3 Education    
  a. Net Enrolment Rate (NER) of elementary 
level  
91.07 % 
  b. NER of lower secondary level  68.49 % 
  c. NER of upper secondary level  31.24 % 
4 Health    
  a. Household with health insurance 43.4% 
  b. Infant mortality rate 11 per 1000 birth 
  c. Mother mortality rate 1 per 1000 birth 
5 Infrastructure    
  a. Road in good condition by 2011  45% 
  b. Coverage of irrigated crop land  217.5 km2  
6 Administration    
  a. Number of district parliament  45 members 
  b. Number of district agencies and civil 
servant  
27 agencies with 10,384 persons 
  c. Number of sub districts and villages 18 sub districts, 239 villages  
Source: BPS Purbalingga (2012) 
 
The persistent of poverty problem in this district may be related to geographical 
factor. This district is, unfortunately, not located in the main route of trans-province roads 
and far away from the port. Therefore, trading, industry as well as tourism sectors are 
difficult to develop. When most of the districts in the north coastal areas of Java 
experienced rapid development in industry and trading from 1970s to 1990s, and even 
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some were transformed into urban areas, the economy of Purbalingga district were slowly 
growing. In term of human development index, among totally 35 districts and 
municipalities in Central Java province, Purbalingga district was always positioned bellow 
the 30th rank. Anecdotally, the district was labeled as a retirement district (kota pensiunan) 
due to its desolated situation.  
Historically, there have been some development programs executed in the district. 
During the period of 1970s and 1980s, when Indonesia was still under centralized system 
of New Order regime, the central government launched many rural development programs. 
The windfall of oil revenues in 1970s made the central government able to finance large-
scale rural development programs in Indonesia. In Purbalingga district, through the 
program of Green Revolution, the central government built about 159 dams and around 
296 km of technical irrigation network. In education sector, elementary schools were built 
in each village while lower secondary schools were provided in each sub-district. In health 
sector, polyclinics were built in each sub-district, accompanying health posts that were 
made available in each village. In term of infrastructure, electricity network was provided 
in all villages in this district during the beginning 1990s through the program Electricity 
Comes to Village. Asphalt road and clean water facilities were built only in few selected 
villages. Further, during the New Order regime, each village received a development fund, 
locally known as Dana Bandes, amounting to about IDR 100 thousand per year in 1970s 
and gradually increased to about IDR 10 million in 1990s. All of these programs had 
contributed to the economic growth of the district as well as the improvement of quality of 
life of the people, although its speed was not as fast as the other districts.  
In 2001, along with the implementation of decentralized system, district 
government was no longer only responsible for executing the central government 
programs, but also for planning and financing locally made ones. Responding to the 
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transfer of tasks from the central government, Purbalingga district government in 2005 
issued both documents of medium and long term strategic plan, which were completed by 
the minimum standard of services and the targets being expected. On the paper, in order to 
achieve a vision of “the autonomous, competitive and lofty Purbalingga”, rural areas will 
be the main target of development programs. According to the documents, development 
programs will be focused on improvement of infrastructure facilities, fulfillment of basic 
needs and empowerment of rural people.  
By 2011, the structure of the district consisted of 29 agencies including one district 
secretariat, one parliament secretariat, 10 implementer agencies (dinas) consisting of 
agencies of farming and forestry, poultry and fishery, trading and cooperation, manpower, 
public work, transportation, education, health, tourism, family planning, and 17 auxiliary 
agencies (Badan and Kantor) consisting of agencies of planning, inspectorate, community 
empowerment, political affairs, public security, archive, agriculture extension service, food 
security, disaster management, investment, license, civil registration, environment, drugs 
and narcotic prevention and taxes office. The district was administratively divided into 18 
sub-districts and 239 villages. Further, local parliament consisted of 45 members. The 
number of civil services was about 10,217 people.  
So far, the district government is the main provider of rural education and health 
service. In education sector, about 75% of schools were government school. There were 
about 230 kindergartens, 647 elementary schools, 110 low secondary schools and 73 high 
secondary schools in this district. In health sector, in addition of two private and one 
government hospitals available at district centre, rural people relied on the 161 village 
policlinics and 22 sub-district health centers to obtain primary medical treatment (BPS 
Purbalingga, 2012). 
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4.3. Study Villages of Serang, Kedarpan and Sumilir 
The villages of Serang, Kedarpan and Sumilir cover an area of 13.09 km2, 2.25 km2 
and 2.26 km2 respectively. Serang is located in the mount foot of Slamet Mountain, a 
relatively high dry land with altitude between 800 and 1000 m.a.s.l. In term of area size, it 
is the largest village in Purbalingga District. Kedarpan is ecologically located in middle dry 
land with altitude between 400 and 500 m.a.s.l. Last, Sumilir is ecologically located low 
wet land with altitude between 50 and 100 m.a.s.l, within the watercourse of Klawing 
River, which is one of the biggest rivers in Purbalingga district.  
By 2010, there were 1,246 households living in Serang village, from which 77% of 
household heads were working in agriculture sector. Further, Kedarpan village was 
inhabited by 585 households, from which about 46% of household heads worked in 
agriculture sector. The last study village, Sumilir, was inhabited by 547 households, from 
which about 52% work in agriculture sector. Adapting to the existing cropland condition, 
each village had its main farming commodities, which were vegetable, mostly potatoes, 
cabbage and carrot in Serang, cassava in Kedarpan and paddy in Sumilir. The average 
landholding per household was 0.6 ha in Serang, 0.23 ha in Kedarpan and 0.39 ha in 
Sumilir. Besides having the largest landholding, the relatively high price of vegetable 
enable farmers in Serang to earn better income than those in Sumilir and Kedarpan. In 
Sumilir, with the existence of irrigation network, the farmers were able to plant paddy 
twice or three times a year. The farmers in Kedarpan seemingly faced the most difficult 
condition since their landholding was small and the price of cassava was lower than 
vegetable or paddy.  
Although farming was the main livelihood sources in three villages, farming alone 
was not sufficient to meet the daily needs of many villagers, especially in Kedarpan. To 
sustain their life, they had side jobs like part-time livestock, working in the others’ land, 
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becoming mason or going to urban areas as temporary migrants. The other sectors of 
occupation included industry, trading, construction, transportation, running small and 
medium enterprises and becoming civil servant. Some of those working in industry, 
construction and transportation stayed in urban areas like Jakarta as migrants. Those 
running small and medium enterprises mostly produced foods like coconut sugar, snack or 
tofu (Table 4.2).  
 
Table 4.2. Socio-Economic Condition of Selected Villages, 2011 
No Condition  Serang  Kedarpan  Sumilir  
1 Ecological and geographical        
 a. Size of territory  13.09 km2 2.25 km2 2.26 km2 
 b. Ecological character  Hilly, dry land  Hilly, dry land  Flat, wet land  
 c. Altitude  ±1,000 m.a.s.l. ±400 m.a.s.l. ±100 m.a.s.l. 
 d. Main farming commodity  cabbage, carrot Cassava  Paddy  
2 Socio-economy        
 a. Number of households  1,246 585 547 
 b. Gender of household heads (HHH)    
 1) Male  93% 90% 84% 
 2) Female 7% 10% 16% 
 c. Occupation of HHH        
 1) Agriculture 77% 46% 52% 
 2) Salaried job 9% 24% 32% 
 3) Labor 
4) Business 
1% 
9% 
6% 
19% 
1% 
7% 
 5) Jobless 4% 5% 8% 
 d. Education of HHH     
 1) Not completed primary 21% 14% 16% 
 2) Primary 67% 62% 56% 
 3) Low secondary 7% 14% 15% 
 4) Upper secondary 3% 8% 10% 
 5) University 2% 2% 2% 
3 Administration        
 a. No. of hamlets (sub-village unit)  5 3 3 
 b. No. of upper neighborhood (Rukun Warga/RW) 8  5 3 
 c. No. of lower neighborhood (Rukun Tetangga/RT) 33  11  9  
4 Physical infrastructures within village       
 a. Number of elementary schools 6 2 2 
 b. Number of kindergartens 3 2 1 
 c. Number of village polyclinic  1 1 1 
 d. Main road condition by 2013  Asphalt, good  Asphalt, seriously 
damaged  
Asphalt, slightly 
damaged  
5 Average distance to     
 a. Sub-district capital 5 km 2 km 4 km 
 b. District capital 30 km 26 km 15 km 
 c. Sub district health center 4 km 2 km 4 km 
 d. Junior high school 2 km 2 km 2 km 
 e. Senior high school 5 km 7 km 5 km 
 f. Market 2 km 2 km 4 km 
 g. Bank office 5 km 2 km 4 km 
 h. Post office 5 km 2 km 4 km 
 i. Bus station 5 km 2 km 4 km 
Source: (BPS Purbalingga, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c)and observation in 2013 
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All three villages had some basic physical infrastructures. State kindergarten and 
elementary schools were available in the three villages, and a private low secondary school 
was available only in Serang. Each village had a clinic with one mid wife staying to 
provide basic medical treatment for community. Electricity network was available in the 
three study villages. Small public clean water facility was available only in few 
neighbourhoods in Serang and Kedarpan, and most of the villagers used uncovered wells. 
Serang and Kedarpan villages always faced difficulties to obtain clean water in dry season. 
Irrigation was available only in Sumilir, which was small-scale network managed by 
village government. Market, public transportation, post office and local banks were only 
available in sub-district capital. The main roads in the villages were asphalted, but severely 
damaged in Kedarpan during 2013 field visit. 
 
4.4. Respondents 
Majority of respondents (87%) were male. In term of education, 58% of 
respondents graduated from primary education. Most respondents (59%) worked in 
agriculture sector. The highest variability of occupation was in Kedarpan, which had the 
lowest share of occupation in agriculture sector. Further, because this study purposively 
selected only villagers having married and been separated household in 2001, age of 
respondents was mostly between 41 and 60 year old. The respondents below 40 years and 
above 61 year-old constituted 11% and 10 % of total respondents, respectively (Table 4.3). 
It was important to see that there were significant difference of education and occupation 
among the study villages. Most respondents in Kedarpan had better education level as well 
as more people working in non-agriculture sector (Table 4.3). 
Most respondents (74%) were found to have less than 0.5 ha of land. This means 
that they mostly engaged in subsistence farming. The limitedness of cropland availability 
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to support a densely populated area such as Java Island made many farmers have a very 
small cropland. In the study villages, villagers having cropland more than one hectare was 
very rare, and if any, they would be regarded as a rich farmer by their neighbors. This 
might explain why poverty rate in the study villages was quite high. Using the poverty line 
at US$ 1.56 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) per person per day, this study finds that 26% 
respondents were chronic poor, 16% were poor, 18% were vulnerable poor and 40% were 
non-poor. 
 
 
Table 4.3. Profile of the Respondents 
No Character Serang Kedarpan Sumilir Total P value 
1 Average Household size  3.8 3.8 4 3.9   
2 Gender of household head (HHH)          0.058* 
 a. Male  104(92) 49 (80) 48 (83) 201 (87) 
 b. Female  9 (8) 12 (20) 10 (17) 31 (13) 
3 Education of HHH      0.005*** 
 a. Uncompleted primary  28 (24) 9 (14) 13 (22) 50 (22) 
 b. Primary  69 (61) 32 (53) 33 (57) 134 (58) 
 c. Low secondary 10 (9) 11 (18) 7 (12) 28 (12) 
 d. High secondary 3 (3) 7 (12) 5 (9) 15 (6) 
 e. University  3 (3) 2 (3) 0 (0) 5(2) 
4 Occupation of HHH      0.044** 
 a. Agriculture  78 (69) 24 (39) 36 (62) 138 (59) 
 b. Labor  15 (13) 17 (28) 10 (17) 43 (18) 
 c. Salaried Job  3 (3) 6 (10) 3 (5) 12 (5) 
 d. Business  11 (10) 12 (20) 6 (11) 29 (13) 
 e. Jobless  6 (5) 2 (3) 3(5) 11 (5) 
5 Age (years) of HHH      0.005*** 
 a. < 40  7 (6) 14 (23) 4 (7) 25 (11) 
 b. 41-50  50 (44) 20 (33) 23 (39.5) 93 (40) 
 c. 51-60  49 (44) 18 (29) 23 (39.5) 90 (39) 
 d. > 61  7 (6) 9 (15) 8 (14) 24 (10) 
6 Size of Landholding     0.000 *** 
 a. <0.5 ha 67 (60) 49 (81) 54 (93) 170 (74) 
 b. 0.51-1 ha 25 (23) 7 (12) 2 (3.5) 34 (15) 
 c. 1.1-1.5 ha 9 (8) 3 (5) 0 (0) 12 (5) 
 d. 1.51-2 ha 7 (6) 0 (0) 0 (0) 7 (3) 
 e. >2 ha 3 (3) 1 (2) 2 (3.5) 6 (3) 
7 Expenditure per person per day in Purchasing 
Power Parity (US$ PPP) 
    0.209 
 a. < 1 (Chronic poor)  28 (25) 10 (17) 21 (36) 59 (26) 
 b. 1.1 - 1.56 (Poor)  14 (13) 14 (23) 8 (14) 36 (16) 
 c. 1.57 – 2 (Vulnerable to poor)  21 (19) 11 (18) 9 (16) 41 (18) 
 d. > 2 (Non-poor)  48 (43) 25 (42) 20 (34) 93 (40) 
Source: Field Survey 2012 (No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) and Field Survey 2013 (No. 6, 7) 
Note: ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%,*significant at 10%  
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Chapter 5 . District Budgeting for Rural Development 
 
5.1.  Introduction 
Budget is the most effective tool to realize government policies, thus analyzing 
budget allocation will provide tangible evidences about prioritization of government 
policies. In the context of rural development, although every development program will 
have an impact on rural people, several sectors should be the priority of government 
spending. As villager’s livelihood relies on agriculture sector and rural areas are usually 
characterized with low human development index and infrastructure availability, thus 
spending for agriculture, education, health and infrastructure are considered very important 
for rural development. 
In order to create a better spending for rural development, scholars and 
international donors usually suggest government to implement fiscal decentralization. 
Fiscal decentralization is expected to promote participatory budgeting system where rural 
people can articulate their interest. Hypothetically, their involvement will push local 
government to increase the spending for rural development (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007; 
Cohen & Peterson, 1997; Parker, 1995).  
Although advocated by many, decentralization in practice does not always create a 
better spending for rural development. For example, in case of Indonesia where 
decentralization is focused at district level, recent studies indicate that a larger percentage 
of district budgets were allocated for recurrent rather than development expenditure (Dixon 
& Hakim, 2009; Mahi, 2010; World Bank, 2007). This has raised a question on how 
effective is fiscal decentralization and participatory budgeting to accommodate the interest 
of rural people.  
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This chapter aims to analyze the spending for rural development and the 
effectiveness of participatory budgeting in Purbalingga district. The rest of this chapter is 
organized as follows: Section 5.2 will present the legal framework of participatory 
budgeting; Section 5.3 will discuss finding of this study, which consists of expenditure 
comparison before and after decentralization and a case study of 2010 budgeting; Section 
5.4 for discussion; Section 5.5 will draw conclusion and policy implication.  
 
5.2. Legal Framework of Participatory Budgeting 
Along with fiscal decentralization, Indonesian government tried to include villagers 
in budgetary decision making by establishing a public hearing mechanism, locally named 
Musrenbang, through Law 25/2004 on National Planning System. In general, the current 
process of budgeting consists of three main stages, which are public hearing, budget 
drafting and budget enactment (Figure 5.1).  
 
 
Figure 5.1. Stages of Budgeting Process 
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The public hearing consists of meetings held at village, sub-district and district 
levels. At village level, village government invites community in the meeting to identify 
development proposals and to select delegations to attend sub-district meeting. 
Subsequently, the sub-district meeting is held to find agreement on the priority proposals 
from this area to be proposed to district meeting. Finally, the district meeting is held by 
inviting the delegations from the villages, district agencies, local associations and Non 
Governmental Organizations (NGO’s). In the district meeting, bottom up proposals are 
discussed together to be funded by the district budget. Further, public hearing is followed 
by budget drafting, which is done by district agencies under supervision of the district 
head. After the budget is drafted, the district head sends the draft to the local parliament to 
be discussed in plenary session.  
 
5.3. Results 
5.3.1. Budget Allocation in Purbalingga District 
When decentralization was started in 2001, district revenues increased by more 
than 200%, thanks to the increase in fiscal transfer (Figure 5.2.A). Ideally, if the district 
wants to prioritize rural development, this revenue inflow should be used more for 
agriculture, education, health and infrastructure. In practice, however, a larger portion of 
the budget was utilized for recurrent expenditure (Figure 5.2.B), which mostly consisted of 
the salary of civil servants (Figure 5.2.C).  
As presented in Figure 5.2.C, recurrent expenditure was increased since 1998, a 
year when Indonesia was hit by the monetary crisis. With a drastic decline in the exchange 
rate of Indonesian rupiah at the time, the government had no option but to increase the 
salaries of civil servants to meet the living costs. Moreover, the merger of central ministry 
field offices with the district government as a result of decentralization in 2001 increased 
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the number of civil servants from 1,743 to 8,907 persons (BPS Purbalingga, 2002). Thus, it 
can be said that the increases in recurrent expenditure before 2001 were unavoidable due to 
external factors. 
 
  
  
Figure 5.2. Purbalingga District Budget, 1991-2011 
Source: Author’s calculation from annual Purbalingga district budgets. Data are obtained from (BPS 
Purbalingga, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005) and the homepage of 
Ministry of Finance at http://www.djpk.depkeu.go.id/datadjpk/105/ and http://www.djpk.depkeu.go.id/datadjpk/131/ 
Note: The value of money is converted into real values of 1991 
 
Besides those unavoidable reasons, a poor recruitment system of civil service had 
substantially contributed to the further increase in the recurrent expenditure. There was so 
far no workload analysis to identify the number and qualifications of civil servants needed 
in this district. This made the number of civil servants always increased over years, 
reaching the figure of 10,384 persons by 2010 (BPS Purbalingga, 2011d). Some indication 
of organizational inefficiency was also found. For example, tasks in agriculture sector, 
which might be more efficient to be handled by a single agency, were managed by four 
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agencies, namely: Forestry and Farming Agency; Poultry Agency; Agriculture Extension 
Agency; Food Security Agency. Thus, it is not surprising that under decentralized system, 
a larger portion of district budget was allocated for recurrent expenditure. This is because 
the more is the number of district agencies and civil services, the higher is the expense of 
salary and operational cost for them. Besides that, it is also important to note that various 
kinds of allowance were locally determined based on district head policy. 
Education, health and village block grant were the sectors where spending were 
consistently increased (Figure 5.2.D). However, these increases were not initiated by the 
district government. There were Law 20/2003 on National Education System, Law 
36/2009 on Health and Government Regulation 75/2005 on Village, which directed district 
government to allocate more funds in these sectors. Thus, the increases in spending for 
education, health and village block grant were more due to the central government 
intervention rather than the process of decentralization itself.  
 
5.3.2. Process of Budget Formulation 
5.3.2.1. Proceedings of 2010 Budgeting Process 
In January 2010, Purbalingga Local Planning Agency projected that the 2011 
revenues would be IDR 860 billion, an increase by IDR 180 billion from the previous year. 
In line with this revenue projections, the 2011 recurrent expenditure would be IDR 570 
billion, an increase by IDR 100 billion from the previous year (Radar Banyumas Daily 
News, 2010b). This means that more than half of the revenue would be used for recurrent 
expenditure. Further, as annual routine, public hearings began with village meetings in 
February, and sub-district meetings in March. Documentary study on the database of 
village proposals finds that there were about 1,540 projects proposed by rural community, 
which required funding of about IDR 298 billion.  
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All of these proposals were submitted to the district meeting, which was held in the 
district hall in April 1st, 2010. Sessions of the district meeting began in the morning, started 
with the speech from the district head. Thereafter, Local Planning Agency presented the 
projection of revenues and the general indicative budget allocated for each sector. 
Throughout the meeting, lack of budget transparency was observed. Budget documents, 
especially operational expenses, were considered confidential and not presented. There were 
no agenda enabling rural delegations scrutinized the recurrent expenditure items (Head of 
Purbalingga Local Planning Agency, 2010). 
During the afternoon session, the participants were divided into three groups to 
discuss the development proposals of each sector, namely economy, socio-cultural and 
infrastructure group. Although the meeting provided an opportunity for community to submit 
proposals, it did not guarantee the approval of funding. Each village proposal competed not 
only with the proposals from the other villages, but also with the proposals from district 
agencies. With only one day meeting, it was impossible to screen all proposals accurately. 
Some problems were unavoidable since there were no clear procedures to screen and 
prioritize the proposals and no field observation to investigate them. Because of different 
level of social or political positions, as well as, different capacity to propose ideas and make 
favorable argument for their proposals, what really happening in the forum was a process of 
negotiation and competition that was often political in nature. In the forum, participants from 
district agencies were seen dominating discussions. Village delegations, with little power and 
experience, could not make strong argument for their proposals. 
District parliament’s plenary session offered the last window of opportunity to gain 
a pro rural development budget after the public hearing could not optimally accommodate 
the village proposals. Yet, the power of district parliament to revise budget draft was 
hardly exercised. Generally, members of the parliament lacked a capacity to evaluate the 
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draft budget as 40% of them graduated only from the upper secondary school. The 
parliament formally only commented on four points in budget allocation, which was that 
district government to allocate more for poorhouse reparation, scholarship for the poor 
children, development of a road network in some sub district, and to focus on road 
reparation rather than new road development. Besides some minor revisions in 
development expenditure, there was no substantial comment to examine the items of this 
expenditure in detail4.  
The result of a tiring and long budgeting process did not meet expectation of most 
rural delegations. The attendance of rural delegations did not influence much on budget 
allocation for rural development. They had many proposals, yet they faced a classic 
problem of budget limitedness during the district meeting. As the following Table 5.1 
shows, 68% of district budget in 2011 was spent for recurrent expenditure. The portion of 
expenditure for main sector of rural development including agriculture, infrastructure, 
health, education and village grants was only about 29% of total budget. Among the 1,540 
proposals with funding requirement of IDR 298 billion, 320 proposals were accepted with 
the funding of about IDR 29 billion5. This means that among IDR 290 billion of total 
development expenditure in 2011, only 10% of them was used to finance proposals from 
village (Purbalingga District Government, 2010a).  
 
                                                          
4   Official Letter of local parliament on 2011 Budget Draft. The author holds the soft copy. 
5  Analyzed from list of village proposals and 2011 budget draft 
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Table 5.1. Budget of Purbalingga District, 2011 
Budget items Amount of money (IDR) 
I. REVENUES 865.161.075.000  
A. Locally generated revenues 91.721.635.000  
1. Local taxes 17.131.721.000  
2. Local service charges 60.429.693.000  
3. Shares of profits of local government enterprise 8.980.000.000  
4. Other locally generated revenues 5.180.221.000  
B. Fiscal Transfer 628.936.355.000  
1. Revenue sharing from central government 39.187.956.000  
2. General Grant 522.204.299.000  
3. Special Grant 67.544.100.000  
C. Other 144.503.085.000  
1. Grants 2.751.586.000  
2. Revenue sharing from province 22.765.992.000  
3. Adjustment fund of special decentralization  54.957.290.000  
4. Financial assistant from province and other 14.827.461.000  
5. Adjustment fund of education budget 49.200.756.000  
  
II. EXPENDITURE 915.827.562.000  
A. Recurrent expenditure 578.069.267.000  
1. Salary 506.584.153.000  
a. Basic salary  314.185.342.900  
b. Family allowance   29.775.831.800  
c. Rice allowance   18.711.693.000  
d. Income taxes     7.958.750.800  
e. Heath insurance     6.879.215.200  
f. Allowance for non-certified-teacher   12.725.850.000  
g. Allowance for certified-teacher   36.476.406.000  
h. Structural allowance     6.361.030.000  
i. Functional allowance   31.650.576.100  
j. General allowance     9.004.924.500  
k. Welfare allowance (8 month)   13.463.817.000  
l. Honor of district revenue collection     3.000.000.000  
m. New civil service salary     7.200.000.000  
n. Allowance for district head        400.000.000  
o. Salary of district parliament     8.630.917.000  
p. Other salary        159.798.700  
2. Interest 70.234.000  
3. Subsidy 300.000.000  
4. Grants and for some selected organization 24.753.418.000  
5. Office maintenance and other operational cost 43.361.462.000  
6. Accidental expenses 3.000.000.000  
B. Development expenditure 337.758.295.000 
1. Agriculture              19.705.743.000  
2. Infrastructure              37.588.358.000  
3. Health              42.774.225.000  
4. Education           127.434.645.000  
5. Village grant              40.097.282.000  
6. Other sectors (IDR)              70.158.042.000  
  
III. FINANCING 
 
A. Local government revenues 57.053.078.000  
1. Balance remaining from previous year budget 52.853.078.000  
2. Local borrowing 2.100.000.000  
3. Repayment of district loan 2.100.000.000  
B. Local government expenditure 6.386.591.000  
1. Investment in district enterprise 2.014.000.000  
2. Payment of district borrowing 2.272.591.000  
3. District loan 2.100.000.000  
Source: Purbalingga District Government (2011)
54 
 
 
5.3.2.2. Evaluation of Budgeting Process by Several Key Actors 
From the perspective of rural delegation, the participatory budgeting was a mere 
formality. A village head routinely attending district public hearing conveyed his 
pessimistic about the effectiveness of public hearing to accommodate village proposals. He 
narrated how he, on several occasions, proposed a building of clean water facility for his 
village to the district government, but the proposal was not accepted yet. He even 
questioned the rationale for annual meetings considering that the previous proposals had 
not been funded6. 
From the perspective of the district government, the main problem was the 
irrationality of community in making proposals. The interviewed officer said, “…You can 
see yourself, how many are the proposals from village government…. I have to cut them so 
that our expenditure will be balanced among all sectors. If not, our agencies cannot work 
since all of the money is only allocated for the village proposals’’. The interviewed officer 
also told that there were difficulties in matching the district program priorities with the 
village proposal. Even, by some extent, the participatory budgeting was seen to be 
something fouling up the draft7.  
Further, the district parliament head indeed recognized that their capacity to 
evaluate the budget draft was low. However, according to him, it did not mean that the 
parliament did nothing to improve the budget for rural development. He even pretended 
that the spending for rural development was significantly higher than before 
decentralization, and praised that this would be impossible without the role of district 
                                                          
6  Interview with one village head in Kejobong sub-district on March 26, 2011 
7  Interview with Mr. T.P.R. (initial name), the officer of planning agency of Purbalingga in 17 
March 2011 
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parliament. Further, he also criticized that the district government was often late in sending 
the budget draft, making parliament not optimal in scrutinizing8. 
For a triangulation, this study investigated budget documents and found that the 
justification of many recurrent expenditure to be questionable. For example, there were 
transfers of grant to about 29 organizations amounting to IDR 10 billion. They included a 
sport committee, a women group namely Pemberdayaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga whose 
members are mostly wives of the district officers, a civil service association, a pensioner 
association, and many others, which were questionable to have direct link with community 
development programs. Further, the cost of meeting and travel to province and central 
government institutions was quite high, reaching figure of IDR 6.5 billion. Considering that 
in decentralization, district government was supposed to solve its problems based on local 
initiative, this amount was questionable and considered excessive (Purbalingga District 
Government, 2010a). All of the findings from the investigation to district budget show that 
there were actually still many possible spaces to decrease recurrent expenditure and, vice 
versa, to increase development expenditure. 
Further, the district parliament was partly responsible for the rise in recurrent 
expenditure. They spent about IDR 5 billion for training, study tour and work visit of its 
only 45 members as compared to a budget of only IDR 7.5 billion for irrigation 
(Purbalingga District Government, 2010a). Even, some members of parliament proposed 
an extra additional fund allocated to parliament members to accommodate the proposal from 
their constituent (Radar Banyumas Daily News, 2010a). All of these findings show that the 
parliament was not only lacked of capacity to evaluate the budget draft, but also, more 
importantly, it lacked of sensitivity to prioritize the development expenditure. 
 
                                                          
8  Interview with the district parliament head, 18 February 2013 
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5.4. Discussion 
Public involvement in budgeting process is a topic gaining a great attention from 
the literatures. Ebdon and Franklin (2006) make a review on existing literatures on 
participatory budgeting and find that public participation in budgeting is still a complex 
issue. According to them, there are principally three factors influencing the effectiveness of 
participatory budgeting to accommodate public interest. The factors are the selected 
mechanism to involve the community, process within the mechanism and political and 
governmental environment.  
Literatures identify various mechanism of participatory budgeting, which range 
from public hearing, focus group discussion by committee and survey (Ebdon & Franklin, 
2006). Each mechanism has its strengths and weaknesses. For example, a public hearing is 
usually better in term of representativeness because it can involve many rural people, but 
its discussion can be not focused due to high number of participant. Vice versa, a focus 
group discussion through a specially created committee may deeply analyze the budget, 
but its membership is usually very limited. In Indonesia, the overall mechanism is a 
combination of public hearing and focus groups discussion, which is good because it 
overcomes the weaknesses of one method by the other.  
The problem may be the process within mechanism itself. For example, from the 
case of Purbalingga district, although budgeting totally took time of one year, the district 
government did not use it to make field observation of proposals and to send the budget 
draft to parliament on time. If there were a field observation, the budgeting result would be 
fairer. So far, the results were questionable because within a meeting where participants 
came from different background with unequal political power, discussion would not be 
effective to create fair decision. 
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There are also problems of political environment. Foremost, the number of civil 
servant had been un-proportional, thus the salary spending was high. Further, the 
confidentiality of recurrent expenditures indicated low transparency and low willingness of 
district government to seek public inputs. It may be true that community has been irrational 
in making proposal. Yet, if the budget information was openly shared, such irrationality 
might be decreased. By openly sharing the information, public could evaluate the recurrent 
expenditure, thus some unimportant items could be deleted.  
 
5.5. Conclusions and Policy Implication 
By analyzing the portion of development expenditure in the district budget after 
decentralization, this study concludes that so far the district government of Purbalingga has 
not prioritized rural development. The increase in recurrent expenditure was indeed 
unavoidable in the initial years of decentralization. However, inefficiency in establishing 
district agencies and non-existence of workload analysis for civil service recruitment 
accounted to this increasing trend of recurrent expenditure. There were also many 
evidences that some recurrent expenditure is not truly necessary. Further, the existing 
participatory budgeting still cannot effectively accommodate rural community interest. The 
biggest implementation gap within the current mechanism is the governmental 
environment. Low willingness of the district government to share budget information has 
hindered the effectiveness of public participation. In addition, there are no clear procedures 
to screen the village proposals, and local parliament lack requisite capacity to analyze the 
draft budgets as well as sensitivity to local problems. All of these implementation gaps 
make public not able to influence the budgeting process to increase spending for rural 
development. 
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This study recommends Purbalingga district to reform its organization to be more 
efficient. It can be started by restructuring the current district agencies and by conducting 
study on workload analysis to identify the proportional number of civil service. Further, the 
district should also improve the implementation of budgeting forum by disseminating 
budget information freely and by crafting clear-cut procedures for selecting proposals, for 
example by conducting field observation to examine the proposals.  
At the national level, central government is expected to strengthen its monitoring 
on the utilization of the district budget. The experience from the regulations on education, 
health and village block grant shows that they are effective to increase the spending in 
respective sectors. Similar regulations setting the minimum portion of district budget to be 
allocated can be enacted for agriculture and rural infrastructure sectors. 
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Chapter 6 . Social Capital for Decentralized Rural Development 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Social capital has recently become one of the main issues in community 
development debates. Study by Putnam (1993) in rural Italy identifies a specific character 
of social relation that will influence the success of development programs. The 
characteristic is generally called as civic tradition, and more narrowly, social capital. It is 
not simply a product of intentional policy design, rather it is the outcomes of a long time 
process entrenched in the community history (Hadiz, 2010). To be successful, it is argued 
that decentralization should be rooted in a functioning local and participatory self 
governance institutions (Hadiz, 2010).  
Rural community in Indonesia has traditionally built a social relation as well as 
collective action since the past time. Keyfitz (1985), in his study within one village in Java 
during 1950s, find that a tradition of helping each other was commonly practiced in his 
study village. Not only was the tradition of self-help, but also various informal institutions, 
mostly traditional and religious organizations, which facilitated the social relations among 
the villagers. Keyfitz’s study indicates that a long time before the New Order regime came 
to power, social capital had been existed within Indonesian rural community. 
However, the policy of New Order regime in implementing a state-led-rural-
development system might have an influence on the social capital. As Antlöv (2000) has 
clearly described, in the name of efficiency, the regime homogenized and bureaucratized 
rural institutions in Indonesia. Various institutions were established by the state, all with 
the same structure and name throughout Indonesian villages, to be the only vehicle of rural 
development and the only media where voices of community could be channelized. The 
system might have weakened the informal rural institutions where social capital of 
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Indonesian villagers traditionally existed. Thus, whether the existing social capital in 
Indonesian rural areas was sufficient to sustain decentralization or not was questionable.  
This chapter aims to analyze the existing social capital and its utilization to execute 
decentralization in Indonesia. This study is aware that this chapter alone will not be able to 
analyze the whole concept of social capital due to its broad dimension. Among various 
indicators of social capital proposed by literatures, study by Grootaert (1999) has shown 
that institutional membership can be a good indicators to measure social capital in 
Indonesia. Therefore, this study will emphasize on dimension of institutional membership. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 will present findings consisting 
of social capital and its utilization in decentralization. Section 6.3 will provide discussion, 
and Section 6.4 will draw conclusion and policy implication. 
 
6.2. Results 
6.2.1. Social Capital 
Various types of organization existed in the study villages, initiated either by the 
state or by community. To simplify the analysis, this study will categorize those 
organizations into five types based on similarity of their role, as follows: 
1. Governmental organizations, which are the organizations given a power from the state 
to conduct some specific tasks.  
a. Village officers, which consist of tens people to conduct daily administration tasks 
in village office. 
b. Village parliament, which consists of 5 to 11 people to supervise village officers. 
c. Village development committee, which consists tens people to execute physical 
development. 
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d. Neighborhood groups, which are sub-hamlet units consisting of 50 –100 
households living in the same location. 
2. Social Service Groups, which are the groups providing specific services like 
education, health, family planning, etc, to their members. In the study villages, this 
study finds: 
a. Group of homemakers (dasawisma/PKK), a group of homemakers to promote 
secondary income generation. 
b. Group of health service post (Posyandu), a group to serve health care for child 
and pregnant mother, vaccination and family planning.  
c. Civilian defense group (hansip), a group to maintain security and to conduct night 
patrol. 
d. Funeral group, a group to maintain cemetery and to serve a funeral ritual of dead 
villagers. 
3. Farmer groups. The groups promoting mutual assistance of their member to increase 
agriculture production.  
4. Religious Groups. The groups promoting religious activities like collective praying 
and mosque maintenance. 
5. Other. Under this category are sport club, art group, etc which cannot be simply 
categorized in the previous four groups 
 
In term of membership number, and except neighborhood groups where all 
villagers were automatically the member, community initiated groups had more members 
than the state initiated groups. Neighborhood group, religious group, farmer group, group 
of health service post and group of homemakers were the groups where most of the 
respondents become member (Table 5.1). In the hamlet of Bojongsari of Kedarpan village, 
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there was one funeral group having substantial number of membership. Among 20 
respondents in the hamlet of Bojongsari, 16 respondents were members of this funeral 
group. Most of the active groups were informal and existed based on hamlet proximity. 
They maintained periodical meeting by establishing rotating saving group and managing 
soft loan for the members. 
Although many organizations existed in the study villages and many respondents 
became the members, not all of those becoming member were active. The differentiation 
between active and non-active members in this study was made based on respondent’s 
attendance on group meetings. The respondents were given a question on whether they 
attended group meetings or not. If they answered that they often or always attended the 
meeting, this study categorized them as an active member. In contrary, if they answered 
that they never or only rarely attended the group meeting, this study will then categorize 
them as a non-active member. Through this method of categorization, this study finds 
some gap. For example, although all respondents were by regulation automatically 
becoming members of neighborhood groups, only 59% were active members. In general, 
neighborhood group, followed by religious and farmer group were the three first 
organizations having active membership (Table 6.1). Therefore, it was fair enough to say 
that community initiated groups were generally more active than the state initiated group. 
Further, only 19% of respondents had not actively joined to any groups. This means that 
institutional membership was high in all villages.  
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Table 6.1.  The Organizations Existing in the Study Villages and the Respondent’s 
Membership 
No Type of groups The founder 
Serang Kedarpan Sumilir Total 
Respondent 
becoming the 
member 
Respondent 
becoming 
the active 
member 
Respondent 
becoming 
the member 
Respondent 
becoming the 
active member 
Respondent 
becoming 
the member 
Respondent 
becoming 
the active 
member 
Respondent 
becoming the 
member 
Respondent 
becoming the 
active 
member 
1 
Neighborhood 
group 
State  111 (100) 64 (58) 60 (100) 38 (63) 58 (100) 33 (57) 229 (100) 135 (59) 
2 
Religious 
Group  
Community  43 (39) 37 (33) 21 (35) 17 (28) 15 (26) 11 (19) 79 (34) 65 (28) 
3 Farmer Group  Community  40 (36) 34 (31) 12 (20) 11 (18) 11 (19) 13 (22) 63 (28) 58 (25) 
4 
Group of Health 
Service Post  
State  25 (23) 20 (18) 7 (12) 5 (8) 4 (7) 3 (5) 36 (16) 28 (12) 
5 Funeral Group  Community  0 0 16 (27) 15 (14) 0 0 16 (7) 15 (7) 
6 
Group of 
Housewife 
(dasawisma/ 
PKK) 
State  4 (4) 3 (3) 2 (3) 2 (3) 12 (21) 9 (15) 18 (8) 14 (6) 
7 
Village 
parliament 
State  2 (2) 2 (2) 3 (5) 1 (2) 2 (3) 2 (3) 7 (3) 5 (2) 
8 
Village 
Development 
Committee  
State  3 (3) 3 (3) 2 (3) 1 (2) 0 (0) 0 5 (2) 4 (2) 
9 
Civilian 
Defense 
(Hansip) 
State  1 (1) 1 (1) 1 (2) 0 1 (2) 1 (2) 3 (1) 2 (1) 
10 Group of driver  Community  1 (1) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
11 
Youth group 
(karang taruna)  
State 1 (1) 0 0 0 2 (3) 0 3 (1) 0 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
Note: Number in parenthesis indicates a percentage 
 
This study is also interested to understand the inclusiveness of organization, 
especially in term of economic background of the active members. Such understanding in 
this matter is important to understand the quality of social relation in the study villages. 
Inclusiveness of organization is expected to facilitate social capital, especially when the 
marginal groups or the poor can participate actively and equally. This study assumes that 
the more inclusive a community group is; the stronger is the horizontal relationship of 
members and therefore the stronger is the social capital. It was found that the existing 
groups were quite inclusive, which means that the poor and non-poor join in the group. 
There was no significant difference of membership across different economic status (Table 
6.2). 
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Table 6.2.  Number of Groups Actively Joined By Respondents  
No Category 
Number of groups being actively joined 
P value 
None  1 group  2 groups  3 groups  4 groups  
1 Village 
19(17) 45(41) 26(23) 18(16) 3(3) 
 0.734 11(18) 22(37) 14(23) 12(20) 1(2) 
13(22) 25(43) 15(26) 5(9) 0(0) 
2 Economic background 
13(22) 27(46) 14(24) 5(8) 0(0) 
 0.365 
9(25) 14(39) 10(28) 3(8) 0(0) 
7(17) 18(44) 6(15) 9(22) 1(2) 
14(15) 33(35) 25(27) 18(19) 3(3) 
  Total 43(19) 92(40) 55(24) 35(15) 4(2)   
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
Note: Number in parenthesis indicates a percentage 
 
6.2.2. Utilization of Social Capital 
The existence of informal groups was due to their role to address various livelihood 
problems in the study villages, for example by providing rotating savings and credit, 
maintaining facilities, organizing prayer, etc. Although these groups were active, which 
means that they had periodical meeting and tried to solve the common problems of the 
members, it did not always means that matters of public policies, development programs 
and governmental affairs were discussed here. More often, those matters were discussed 
only by village officers, village parliament and village development committee. Besides 
membership in these three organizations was very limited, their meetings remained un-
directly accessible by most of the villagers. Therefore, respondent understanding on some 
general matters related to decentralization in Indonesia was relatively low (Figure 6.1). 
Two elements measured in this study were the understanding on some general terms of 
decentralization, and the understanding on some selected major poverty alleviation 
programs implemented during decentralized system.  
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Figure 6.1. Understanding of Respondents on the Some Matters Related to 
Decentralization 
Source: Field Survey, 2013 
Note: Scoring method: Never heard=1; Heard, but not understand=2; partially 
understand=3; Understand=4 
 
Respondent understanding on some general matters related to decentralization in 
Indonesia was relatively low. Two proxies used in this study were the understanding on the 
term of “regional autonomy (autonomy dearth)”, which was broadly quoted and mentioned 
in Indonesia, and “Public Hearing of Local Budget (Musrenbang)”, which was an annual 
event of participatory budget formulation in district and village level. Surprisingly, even 
though these two terms had been used for quite long time, most of the respondents 
answered that they only heard, but did not understand the meaning.  
Most respondents had a relatively similar level of understanding on some major 
programs of poverty alleviation implemented in the study villages. There were several 
programs used as the indicators in this study. Program of Rice for the Poor (Raskin), 
Health Insurance for the Poor (Askeskin), and Program of Poor House Renovation (PPHR) 
were social protection programs delivering rice, free health card and renovation fund, 
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respectively. Further, National Program for Community Empowerment (NPCE) and 
Program of Village Allocation Fund (PVAF) were infrastructural development programs 
implemented since 2004 and 2006 respectively. Except understanding about Raskin and 
Askeskin program, the understanding of respondents on the other programs was low. The 
highest understanding was about the program of Raskin, in which most respondent became 
the beneficiaries. 
 
6.3. Discussion 
The findings of this study are contrary with many concerns that social capital has 
been disappeared due to a long time state intervention during the New Order. As presented 
in the previous section, diverse community groups existed, ranging from neighborhood, 
farming, religious, funeral, women and many others. They facilitated social relations of the 
villagers, provided some kind of social service where the government usually cannot do, 
and tried to solve some livelihood problems.  
The main problem of social capital in Indonesian rural community is not about its 
existence, rather about its utilization. So far, the Indonesian government has not seriously 
taken issues on the utilization of the social capital to execute decentralization Indonesian. 
The design of decentralization, as stipulated in the existing laws and regulations, 
emphasizes more on the role of formal institution of village government where 
membership is limited and access are difficult. The village government is not set-up to 
interact with the informal institutions by the law. Thus, the key point to emerge from this 
study is that the existing community groups do not reflect the civic traditions. The current 
relation between the government and informal institutions is indifferent. If the villagers are 
indifferent with the government, they will mainly engage as a passive actor within the 
development programs.  
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Although some informal groups may be internally strong, lack of external 
connections with the government has limited their effectiveness. To refer the typology of 
social capital by Szreter (2002), the existing network is only a bridging social capital 
among the members, but not linking with the government. Lack of connection with 
external actors having higher power implies to the lack of empowerment to the member. 
The informal institutions are like unused resources in decentralization. They exist in the 
community, and the members indeed utilize them to serve their interest, but the 
government does not. The under-utilization also means that social capital will not be able 
to grow simultaneously. As this study shows, after about twelve years of decentralization 
in Indonesia, community still have less understanding on some very basic term of 
decentralization. 
 
6.4. Conclusions and Policy Implication 
Community social capital in the study villages is generally supportive enough for 
decentralization. This is indicated from the active membership of many respondents in 
rural institutions, mostly those informal. However, social capital is not utilized well to 
execute decentralization since informal institutions are not given an opportunity to enter 
village political arena. While social capital exists within informal institutions and operates 
at the farthest in hamlet level, decentralized system is exercised by formal institution where 
membership is limited and operating at village level.  
For the success of decentralization, and as a way to develop community capacity, 
this study recommends the government to involve informal institutions in the execution of 
decentralization. The regulations on decentralization should oblige village government to 
involve informal institution in developmental decision-making. 
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Chapter 7 . Capacity of Village Government in Implementing Decentralized 
Development 
 
7.1. Introduction 
There is a notion that rural institutions originally have capacity to solve local 
problems. In one sense, this notion is very reasonable. Compared to the outsiders, rural 
people and their institutions are accustomed with their problems and the possible ways to 
solve. Based on an assumption that some capacity exists at rural institutions, it is suggested 
that central government, donors and consultants not to interfere rural community. They 
should facilitate rural institutions by conducting empowerment, giving discretion to make 
decision and providing financial and technical support needed (Cohen & Peterson, 1997; 
Parker, 1995; D. Rondinelli, A. & Cheema, 2007) 
Various development programs have been implemented in many countries by 
emphasizing on role of local institutions. Program of rural community forest in Nepal is 
one example of success story of institutional approach in local resource management. 
Chetri, Joshi, and Maharjan (2007) and Joshi and Maharjan (2007) find that local 
institution in rural Nepal can successfully manage forest resources, somehow making 
forest conservation go hand in hand with rural poverty alleviation. Another example is the 
study by Blair (2000) on empowerment of local government in Bolivia, Honduras, India, 
Mali, Philippines and Ukraine. Blair (2000) finds that empowerment of local government 
bodies leads to increase in their responsiveness and quality of public services.  
Despite the success stories of institutional approach, decentralizing development 
tasks to rural institutions will not be a simple work. Johnson (2001) states that in many 
countries experiencing a long time top down development, local capacity perhaps has been 
eroded. Similarly, UNDP (2002) concludes that despite training of thousands people, lack 
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of skills and weak institutions are still a major problem in many developing countries. In 
addition, although capacity exists, Bebbington (1999) argues that the likelihood that it can 
be realized to achieve good performance depends on capacity of other actors, social 
structure that determine pattern of relationship among actors, and complexity of problems 
that they want to solve. Therefore, one should avoid justifying the capacity by only looking 
at the performance, and vice versa, should not assume that good capacity will always result 
in good performance. The possibility of success in tackling rural problems depends not 
only on capacity of each rural institution as a separated group, but also on their ability to 
work together in a synergetic way.  
An understanding about capacity of village government will help the government to 
formulate policy of capacity development to rural institutions. This chapter has three main 
objectives, which are to assess the current capacity of village government, to understand 
the realization of capacity to address local problems and to evaluate capacity development 
done by the government. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 7.2 will 
discuss the institutions covered in this study and indicators of their capacity; Section 7.3 
will present findings, which consist of socio-economic condition of the selected 
institutions, capacity of selected institutions, realization of capacity, and capacity 
development done by the government; Section 7.4 will provide discussion; Section 7.5 will 
draw conclusion and policy implication.  
 
7.2. The Institutions Covered by this Study 
Many parts of the current landscape of village government are still a heritage of 
New Order policy in local political and development sphere during 1968 to 1998. At that 
time, to increase efficiency of top-down planning, through Law 05/1974 on Village, the 
regime homogenized village government structure and put it in the hierarchy of 
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administration as the lowest level of government (Antlöv, 2000; Smoke & Lewis, 1996; 
Tinker & Walker, 1973). Various institutions were established in rural areas, and not only 
they existed throughout all villages with the same structure, but also they were the only 
organizations through which community voices to government could be channelized and 
the development programs would be delivered (Antlöv, 2000, 2003; Evers, 2000). After 
decentralization policy, most of the institutions still existed without substantial change. 
The only substantial change was introduction of village parliament.  
Since decentralization is a matter of task distribution among government levels, the 
nature of village as government level is more prominent in the regulations rather than as a 
community group. Regulation of Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) 5/2007 on Rural 
Community Institution principally distributes the tasks on rural development to several 
governmental institutions 9 , namely village officer, village parliament and village 
development committee. In addition, there are also four levels of rural leadership 
consisting of village head, hamlet head, upper neighborhood head and lower neighborhood 
head. They are the institutions practically involved in almost all rural development 
projects.  
The following sub sections will briefly describe the origin, membership, function 
and capacity indicators attributed to each institution. By following Mizrahi (2004) 
suggestion that in an analytical framework, indicators of capacity should be made based on 
“capacity of whom” and “capacity to do what”, capacity indicators are set based on the 
tasks of each institution. 
 
                                                          
9  This study employs Uphoff (1985) classification on rural institutions. According to him, there are three 
types of rural institutions, which are governmental institution, membership institution and private 
institution. Governmental institutions are institutions whose the power are given by the government 
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7.2.1. Village Officer 
Village officer consists of about ten people including village head, secretary, staffs 
and hamlet heads. Community directly elects village head every six years. Village 
secretary, staff and hamlet heads are recruited from villagers to serve up to 56 years old. 
While village secretary and staffs conduct village administration, hamlet heads are 
community leader in their respective areas. Among all institutions covered in this study, 
only village officers who routinely work in village office and earn salary from their 
position. Their salary comes from two main sources, which are bengkok land, which is a 
specific plot of land given to each village officer during his time of service, and some 
supplementary allowance given by district government.  
The task of village officers is to administer rural development. Therefore, the 
indicators used to assess their capacity are the understanding on rural development 
mechanism, skill on proposal making, skill on budget reporting and skill to operate 
computer. Further, village heads and hamlet heads are a leader of their respective 
community levels. In planning stage, they are responsible to disseminate information, to 
formulate the strategy, to solve problems and to accommodate different inputs from 
community. In execution stage, they are responsible to encourage their community to 
participate. In evaluation stage, they are responsible to provide report for transparency and 
accountability. By considering these tasks and the concept of Javanese leadership 
identified by Maurer (1996) and Velsink (1996), their leadership capacity indicators are set 
as follows: 
1. Informativeness, which is to provide information and to socialize development 
programs to community; 
2. Creativity, which is to be able to identify the most effective way to solve local 
problems and to create new programs for betterment of local livelihood; 
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3. Fairness, which is to distribute development programs fairly without discrimination 
to all villagers; 
4. Encouragement, which is to motivate people to participate in development; 
5. Responsiveness, which is to give a fast respond to local problems; 
6. Accountability, which is to provide a report of village budget; 
7. Submission to consensus, which is to obey and consistent to decisions made by the 
meeting. 
 
7.2.2. Neighborhood Group 
Neighborhood group originally came from a tonari gumi system introduced by 
Japanese army during its occupation in Indonesia. Neighborhood group consists of two 
levels. The lower level is Neighbor Solidarity Unit (Rukun Tetangga /RT), which is group 
of about fifties households living in the same areas. The upper level is Community 
Solidarity Unit (Rukun Warga/RW), which is the association of 2-5 RTs adjoining each 
other. All households are automatically members of neighborhood groups. Villager elects 
the heads every five years, and their position is set below the hamlet heads. However, they 
are not part of village officer.  
Initially created to mobilize people, neighborhood groups have evolved to become 
community organization having broader functions ranging from maintaining neighborhood 
security, conducting demographic registration, generating community contribution, 
disseminating information from the government and linking communication between 
villagers and village officer. In this study, the role of neighborhood heads will be narrowed 
to those related to the implementation of rural development programs. The indicators of 
leadership capacity of neighborhood head are the same as those of village head and hamlet 
heads. 
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7.2.3. Village Parliament 
Village parliament or Badan Permusyawaratan Desa (BPD) is new institution 
established after the decentralization policy in 2001. It consists of 5 to 11 people elected 
every six years and can be re-elected once. Different from the other levels of parliament 
where candidates run for election through political party, villagers run for village 
parliament not through political parties but directly as an individual. There is formally no 
work linkage between village parliament and the other levels of parliament.  
Regulation stipulates that their tasks are to channelize community aspirations, to 
supervise village officer and to enact village decree. Therefore, capacity indicators of 
village parliament are the ability to generate aspiration and to monitor village government.  
 
7.2.4. Village Development Committee  
Village Development Committee or Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa 
(LKMD) was introduced in 1980s. It consists of about ten people to execute physical 
projects. The head is elected every five years, more often only by neighborhood heads, 
while the members are selected by the elected head. The pattern of relationship with 
village officer and parliament is coordination, consultation and partnership. 
The main tasks of Village Development Committee are to execute physical projects 
and to mobilize labors, cash and other resources. Therefore, capacity indicators of village 
development committee are technical skill in infrastructure building and ability to mobilize 
resource.  
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7.3. Results 
7.3.1. Socio-Economic Condition of Selected Institutions 
The education of most members was high secondary level. By considering that 
villager’s education was commonly elementary school, graduating from high secondary 
level was good enough in the study villages. This means that the governmental institution 
members mostly came from better educated groups within the community. In term of age 
composition, those in Serang were averagely younger than the other two villages. Serang 
and Kedarpan also had younger village heads compared to Sumilir. Before becoming a 
village head, both Serang and Kedarpan village heads spent most of their time out of the 
village as migrants, and just came back to the village few years before election in 2008. No 
one of the two had experience in any rural institutions before. On the other hand, Sumilir 
had the oldest village head. He was ex of elementary school teacher, and had been active in 
some rural institutions long before the election. Further, Serang village head had the 
highest education level. 
In term of occupation, the three villages had similar phenomenon. Farmer, civil 
servants and retired persons dominated the governmental rural institutions. This was an 
interesting phenomenon because civil servant and retired persons constituted only 2% in 
Serang, 3% in Kedarpan and 9% in Sumilir (BPS Purbalingga, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). This 
study finds that besides they were generally more educated than the common villagers, 
they had more time to be active in village government. This was why they held many 
positions at formal rural institutions either those through selection or appointment process.  
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Table 7.1. Profile of Village Government 
No Institution 
Village 
Serang Kedarpan Sumilir 
1 Village Head  
   
 
 Education  Under graduate Upper secondary Upper secondary 
 
 Age (year)  38 45 67 
 
 Occupation background Salaried job Business Salaried job 
2 Other village officers  
   
 
 Number (person)  12 11 12 
 
 Average education (year)  10 10 11 
 
 Average age (year)  45 43 42 
3 
Upper Neighborhood (Rukun Warga 
/RW) heads    
 
 Number (person)  8 5 3 
 
 Average education (year)  7 6 6 
 
 Occupation background (farmer : 
non-farmer)  
4:4 2:3 2:1 
4 
Lower Neighborhood (Rukun 
Tetangga/RT) heads    
 
 Number (person)  33 11 9 
 
 Average education (year)  6 8 8 
 
 Occupation background (person)  25:8 7:4 5:4 
5 Village parliament  
   
 
 Number (person)  10 5 4 
 
 Average education (year)  11 12 12 
 
 Occupation background (farmer : 
non-farmer)  
5:5 3:2 2:2 
6 Village development committee  
   
   Number (person)  15 12 9 
   Average education (year)  12 12 11 
  
 Occupation background (farmer : 
non-farmer)  
8:7 3:9 1:8 
Source: (BPS Purbalingga, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c) 
 
7.3.2. Assessing the Capacity of Village Government  
7.3.2.1. Village Officer 
7.3.2.1.1. Leadership Capacity 
Rural leaders, especially village head, are the most influencing actors within 
community. Community decision making is influenced very much by the perspective of 
rural leaders. Although the democratization movements after the fall of New Order regime 
might have decreased the extent of their power of rural leaders, the traditional hierarchical 
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relationship was still strong enough (Antlöv, 2000). The result of questionnaires distributed 
to villagers shows that total score of village head capacity was highest in Serang and 
lowest in Kedarpan (Figure 7.1). However, the highest score of hamlet head’s capacity was 
in Kedarpan.  
 
  
Figure 7.1. Community Perception on Village Head and Hamlet Head Leadership 
Source: Field survey, 2012 
Note: Scoring method: 1=Poor; 2=Slightly poor; 3=Good enough; 4=Good 
 
In Serang, most respondents told that the village head was quite good in conducting 
his function as a community leader. The village head invite many villagers in village 
meetings and utilized the meetings to socialize government programs and to share his idea 
of development plan. During project implementation, the village head was willing to visit 
the location to control the workers, to join the villagers as well as to encourage them to 
become voluntary workers. The respondents also felt that he gave equal treat to all hamlets 
and villagers. All of this leadership practices contributed to a positive assessment from the 
villagers to Serang village head. 
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In Kedarpan, the respondents gave lowest assessment on the leadership capacity of 
village head. The decision of village head to apply strict representation system in the 
village meeting had contributed to a low assessment from the respondents. Documentary 
study on Kedarpan Village Government (2010) shows that village meeting was attended 
only by rural institution heads, mainly neighbourhood heads. Therefore, most villagers had 
limited understanding on what the village head had done as a community leader. Most 
villagers got information of development programs from hamlet and neighbourhood heads 
during a meeting in their respective area. Therefore, villagers in Kedarpan gave higher 
assessment to the hamlet and neighbourhood heads. 
Among the seven indicators of leadership, score of accountability is the lowest. 
Observation finds that budget transparency like presenting report in a public information 
board was not practiced in the three villages. Also, from documentary study and interview, 
meetings of responsibility after projects were finished were not always conducted 
(Kedarpan Village Government, 2010; Serang Village Government, 2010; Sumilir Village 
Government, 2010).  
 
7.3.2.1.2. Administration Capacity 
Self-assessment questionnaire distributed to the village officers in Serang, 
Kedarpan and Sumilir shows that they had good enough skill in development 
administration (Figure 7.2). Observation and documentary study finds that the tools needed 
to conduct development administration had been available in each village office. There 
were at least two sets of computer and printer in each village office. In addition, the district 
government every year distributed various village administration books. 
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Figure 7.2. Self-Assessment Questionnaire on the Capacity of Village Officer 
Source: Field survey, 2012 
Note: Scoring method: 1=Poor; 2=Slightly poor; 3=Good enough; 4=Good 
 
However, their administration skills were not always translated into action. For 
example, during visiting to the village offices, this study finds that the monograph board in 
the office wall was not up dated. The latest available data were about three years ago. 
Administration of development projects was bounded in a mimeo of annual report of 
development budget. However, the documents were mostly not accessible for the villagers. 
After this study accessed the documents, it found that the pages on budget plan, record of 
the expenses, bill proof, attendant list, technical drawing and photograph of outputs were 
quite well arranged because they were objects of inspection by the district staff. The rest 
pages on the report on difficulties or local problems were just copied from year to year 
(Kedarpan Village Government, 2010; Serang Village Government, 2010; Sumilir Village 
Government, 2010). 
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7.3.2.2. Neighborhood Heads 
The heads of neighborhood groups formally should be elected every five years. 
However, in practice, once a person was elected, he could keep the position for longer time 
due to reluctance of the other villagers to hold the position. Having a quite many tasks but 
receiving almost no incentives was the main reason why the villagers were reluctant to 
become neighborhood head. The tasks of two levels of neighborhoods were overlapped 
each other. In most cases, the lower level was more active than the higher level. This is 
supported with the result of questionnaire that shows higher score of lower neighborhood 
heads (Figure 7.3). Among the four levels of community leader in village, the lower 
neighborhood head became the most favorable. They became a safety net when the upper 
community leader did not function. Neighborhood heads in Kedarpan got the highest 
scores, which might be resulted from the reliance of villagers on neighborhood to get 
information. As previously described, the village of Kedarpan applied quite strict 
representation system where the villagers had limited opportunity to be invited in the 
village meeting.  
Neighborhood heads were the closest institution to community where daily 
community problems, complains and other affairs would first come to. Interview with the 
villagers reveals that most neighborhoods had periodical meetings, and information on 
development programs was sometimes delivered through this meeting. Therefore, it is fair 
enough to say that although neighborhood groups were initially established by the state as 
the tools to mobilize people, they had transformed to act for villager’s interest rather than a 
vehicle of state control. 
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Figure 7.3. Community Perception on the Leadership of Neighborhood Heads 
Source: Field survey, 2012 
Note: Scoring method: 1=Poor; 2=Slightly poor; 3=Good enough; 4=Good 
 
 
7.3.2.3. Village Parliament 
Although empowered by law, the village parliament was somewhat confused as to 
what to do. There was also indication that they lacked knowledge to deal with specific 
problems. For example, the interviewed village parliaments told that their tasks were to 
give inputs and warning to village head. Yet, when more detail questions were given, for 
example, how if the inputs were neglected and warning was not effective, no clear answer 
could be generated. Mostly they answered to try to create consensus and to prevent an open 
conflict with village head. Village parliament in the three villages had never used their 
power to initiate village decree10.  
Occupation background was seen to determine the ability to propose idea. Most of 
the village parliaments with farmer background were not capable enough to speak in front 
of a village meeting. Simply said, they came to the meeting but no idea could be 
                                                          
10   Summarized from the interview with the head of Kedarpan parliament in February 23rd, 2012, the head 
of Sumilir parliament in January 18th, 2012 and the head of Serang parliament in February 2nd, 2012 
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generated 11 . Village parliaments with background of civil servant was usually more 
educated and experienced. However, because they were still a part of bureaucracy, they 
were usually reluctant to make open confrontation to government policies. This institution 
was also not so popular within community. Some villagers only knew village parliament 
members from their hamlet, even the other villagers forgot the parliament members. 
Villager’s perception on the capacity of village parliament is presented in the Figure 7.4. 
 
 
Figure 7.4. Community Perception on the Capacity of Village Parliament 
Source: Field survey, 2012 
Note: Scoring method: 1=Poor; 2=Slightly poor; 3=Good enough; 4=Good 
 
Some weaknesses on the current regulations were identified by this study. As a 
village legislative body, regulations required no accountability mechanism of village 
parliament to community. For example, there was no legal obligation to notify the decision 
made by village parliament to the community.  
 
                                                          
11  Summarized from the interview with the head of Kedarpan village in January 12 th, 2012; the head of 
Kedarpan parliament in February 23rd, 2012, the head of Sumilir parliament in January 18th, 2012; and 
the head of Serang parliament in February 2nd, 2012 
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7.3.2.4. Village Development Committee 
Village Development Committee was quite popular within the village due to its role 
in the team of rural development projects. They presented in almost all physical projects by 
designing the building and by coordinating the workers directly. The committee mainly 
consisted of villagers mastering construction, either by education or by experience. 
Therefore, they had sufficient skill to carry out a small-scale infrastructure development 
like road improvement, irrigation channel and small bridge. Villager’s perception on the 
capacity of village development committee is presented in Figure 7.5.  
 
 
Figure 7.5. Villager’s Perception on the Capacity of Village Development Committee 
Source: Field survey, 2012 
Note: Scoring method: 1=Poor; 2=Slightly poor; 3=Good enough; 4=Good 
 
Regulation of MoHA 5/2007 stipulates that village development committee is 
community organization to be the partner of village head in mobilizing local resources and 
in executing development projects. However, the position of this institution is somewhat 
confusing. It is not clear enough whether the village head, village parliament or community 
who should control the committee. Villagers usually had limited access to the committee. 
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Interview with heads of village development committee reveals that they took position as a 
sub-ordinate of village head rather than as a representation of villagers. What they did was 
to implement the order given by village head, and they felt to be accountable more to the 
village head rather than to community12.  
 
7.3.3. Realization of the Capacity 
The following sub-sections will present the evidences on how the existing capacity 
was realized to address local problems. Two types of major problems were identified in the 
study villages. The first was general problem, which was lack of physical infrastructure 
such as road, clean water facilities, irrigation, education and health infrastructure. These 
general problems were found in all villages. Further, limitedness of village budget had 
been the main difficulties to develop rural infrastructure. The second was specific 
problems, which were problems of income and livelihood difficulties. This specific 
problem was mainly related to ecological condition of each village. Serang, a high dry land 
with main commodity was vegetable, faced problems on decreasing soil fertility and 
difficulties to obtain capital to start vegetable planting. Kedarpan, a middle dry land with 
main commodity was cassava, faced problems on in-sufficiency of farming income to meet 
daily needs and lack of job opportunity outside of farming. Sumilir, a low wet land with 
main commodity was paddy, faced problems on decreasing soil quality and frequent rat 
attacks.   
 
7.3.3.1. Case of Serang 
To overcome the problem of budget limitedness for infrastructure building, the 
village head of Serang told that, so far, efforts to mobilize resources during physical 
                                                          
12  Interview with the head of Sumilir village development committee in January 18th, 2012 and the head of 
Kedarpan village development committee in February 23rd, 2012; 
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infrastructure development was going well 13 . He, according to his statement, tried to 
involve rural institution heads and villagers as much as possible in village decision making. 
A meeting between village head, parliament head and development committee head was 
periodically conducted, at least two months once. List of meeting attendance in some 
project reports (Serang Village Government, 2010), as well as a planning meeting where 
the first author observe14, shows that many villagers attended. Most of villagers said that 
the village head was generous15. Combination of popularity of village head and fluent 
communication of rural institutions made resource mobilization could be done without 
substantial difficulties.  
The area of Serang was also much larger than the other village, therefore its needs 
on infrastructure was also higher. In order to get more funds from the government, there 
was an idea to split Serang into two new villages. The idea had been discussed and agreed 
by the community. A formal letter to propose proliferation of village was sent to district 
government, and village head together with village parliament were lobbying some district 
officers.  
With regard to problem of decreasing soil quality, either village head or officers 
told that village government could not do much effort to solve it. The problem was deemed 
to be out of villager’s capacity. Some farmers started to utilize organic fertilizers from beef 
and chicken feces to normalize the soil quality. However, these organic fertilizers were 
difficult to be promoted since their supply and transportation did not run well.  
                                                          
13  Interview with the head of Serang village in February 2nd, 2012 
14  Conducted in Serang Village on March 7th, 2011 
15  For example is the case of village office reparation in 2008. Due to severely damaged, the office cannot 
be used for administration tasks. According to raw calculation of village development committee, full 
reparation could only be done within two fiscal years, as one annual budget was not sufficient. 
Surprisingly, the village head said that he was willing to provide the additional money needed for 
completed reparation from his own pocket as far as the villagers agreed to reimburse it in the following 
year. Through the meeting, this idea was agreed and the reparation could be started. 
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Some progress was found in effort to improve farmer’s access to credit. In 2008, 
the village received a grant from National Program of Community Empowerment 16 
(NPCE) funds amounting to about IDR 100 millions. The village government used the 
fund to establish a borrowing and lending cooperative, from which villagers could lend the 
money without collateral. During the 2012 observation, cooperative was still functioning, 
and some villagers went there to get lending. Some limitations existed, in which the 
amount of fund was relatively small. The maximum amount of loan was only IDR 5 
millions, which was still less far than enough to obtain all inputs to plant vegetable.  
 
7.3.3.2. Case of Kedarpan 
Different from Serang where the village head involved many villagers, Kedarpan 
village head applied a strong representation system within village meetings. Documentary 
study and participant observation shows that mostly neighborhood heads and development 
committee members who attended the village meeting17. There was no routine meeting 
among rural institution heads, rather, the meeting was conducted as per needs. Although 
the village head applied a strong representation system, hamlet and neighborhood heads 
were well functioning in bridging the communication between villagers and village head 
and in disseminating the information to community. Therefore, cash and labor could be 
mobilized without substantial barriers.  
In order to get more access to district budget, Kedarpan village head also built a 
network with some district parliament members from this area. Entrusting development 
proposal to them was believed to have great chance of funding from district budget rather 
than the village head himself who submit to district government.  
                                                          
16  The program distributed grant to village government to be used for either infrastructure development, 
cooperation or other commonly managed economic activities 
17  Conducted in Kedarpan on March 19th, 2011 
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With regard to the problem of in-sufficient income from farming, either village 
head, village parliament and village development committee admitted that nothing they 
could do. Mostly, it was argued that only if the farmers changed the main crops from 
cassava to the other commodity, then their income would be increased. Interview with 
village head reveals that about ten years ago, the government had distributed many seeds 
of durian in order to increase farmer’s income18. However, the farmers gave limited cares, 
and most of the seeds were died.  
Other than changing the crops from cassava to another commodity having higher 
economic value, no idea could be generated to identify a feasible way to provide job 
opportunity for villagers. Most villagers expected the government to attract investors to 
establish industry in the village. Some also expected the government to provide some 
training for the youth, for example mechanic course. However, what villagers expected 
was beyond the capacity of village government. Attracting investor was the tasks of district 
government, and the idea of delivering training for the youth had never been a priority in 
village budget. The only strategy of village government to improve villager’s livelihood 
was by allocating some portion of village budget to some borrowing and lending groups in 
this village 19 . The other way, in order to facilitate the villagers in looking for job 
opportunity, village officers always eased the procedure when villagers needed a letter of 
reference from the village office to hunt the job.  
 
7.3.3.3. Case of Sumilir 
In Sumilir, resources mobilization was somehow problematic. The village head, 
village parliament and village development committee during separated interviews told 
                                                          
18  Interview with the head of Kedarpan village in January 12th, 2012 
19  Documentary study shows that in 2010, the village government transferred  capital assistance to women 
lending group as much of 10 Million Rupiah (Purbalingga District Government, 2011)  
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that in the village, it was very difficult to create consensus with villagers. For example, it 
needed a very long discussion just to decide the type and location of project. From the 
perspective of village head, he often felt that his policy was always challenged by some 
villagers. According to his unilateral conclusion, it might be provoked by one of the 
defeated candidates during the village head election several years ago20.  
Interviews with some villagers reveal relatively different information. Some 
villagers felt uncomfortable with the high number of familial relationship within village 
officers. In fact, it was found that five officers in the village office had familial relationship 
in the form of father and son or son in law. Further, the village head and the head of 
development committee had their son and daughter married each other. Therefore, in 
village meeting, villagers often had different opinion with village government in order to 
ensure that the village decision was fair to all villagers.  
Interview with the officers of sub-district reveals that there were often mails sent by 
anonym from Sumilir village to complain on village government21. The problems in the 
relationship between some villagers and village officer had influenced the possibility of 
success of Sumilir village in overcoming their local problems. Although there were 
formally limited direct responds from the district government to those anonym mails, some 
reluctance from the district officers to accept the proposals submitted by Sumilir village 
might arise due to disbelieve that the project would be smoothly executed.  
With regard to the problems on decreasing soil quality, just like Serang village, 
village government could not do any effort to overcome it. They actually understood that 
fallowing the cropland in one planting period might recover soil fertility. However, 
                                                          
20  The current village head run for election in 2008 and won from the other four candidates.  
21  Interview with the secretary of Kemangkon sub-district in January 28th, 2012 
 
 
88 
 
fallowing the land was not feasible for many farmers because this would make them had 
no income at all from the farming. 
To overcome the problem on rat attacks, the farmers, coordinated by hamlet heads, 
periodically conducted rat hunting in the night during paddy growing session. District 
government distributed rat poison, firecracker and other tools needed to exterminate the 
rats. Even though it was not completely successful, this method was believed to help 
decreasing rat population. 
 
7.3.4. Capacity Development for Village Government 
On the paper, Purbalingga district government, as written in its Medium 
Development Plan, will prioritize capacity development for village government 
(Purbalingga Local Planning Agency, 2006). Documentary study on annual district budget 
shows that to develop the individual capacity of village officers, there was training 
conducted every year. The duration of the training was usually three to five days, with the 
delivered material includes socialization of the newest regulations, letter and archival 
matters and financial administration. To strengthen the organizational capacity of village 
government, the district government had distributed at least one motorcycle and two sets of 
computer to village office. Software on demographical registration and financial 
administration was also provided along with training for the operators. Besides these 
trainings on administration matters, technical trainings to address the livelihood problems 
were very limited. For example, training on agriculture and other working skill for the rural 
institutions as well as the villagers were very rare.  
However, the district government focused only to develop village officer’s 
capacity. Village parliament, neighborhood head and village development committee were 
still neglected. Although previous sections show that village parliament, neighborhood 
group and village development committee had capacity to conduct their function, their 
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existing competency were not a result of capacity development from district government. 
Rather, it was a result of learning by doing process.  
Moreover, capacity development was not only about training, but also by giving 
opportunity for village governments to do more tasks on rural development. With regard to 
transfer of tasks on rural development, the district government had issued several 
regulations in order to provide legal framework of village government authority. One of 
the most important regulations was District Regulation 21/2007, which regulates the types 
of tasks transferred to village government. Among others, the tasks transferred to village 
governments were to develop rural small irrigation, rural roads, village polyclinics, 
kindergarten, sanitation and other small-scale infrastructure. However, the regulation was 
not followed by a commitment to deliver sufficient fund transfer to village government. 
The portion of district budget given to village government was still low constituted only 
about 5% of total district budget (Purbalingga District Government, 2010a).  
 
7.4. Discussion 
The previous sections have presented the capacities of rural institutions as well as 
their realization to address the existing livelihood problems. The findings of this study are 
generally in line with the argument of Bebbington (1999), who states that a good capacity 
does not always result in a good performance due to complex social cultural factors 
determining capacity realization.  
The cases in Serang, Kedarpan and Sumilir suggest that the possibility of success in 
overcoming the livelihood problems is significantly influenced by how the village heads 
exercise their power. Thus, leadership capacity is very matters. Having the highest capacity 
scores of village head, Serang village can achieve relatively better result in addressing the 
livelihood problems.  
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Perhaps, the most general problems found in the study villages were the problem of 
coordination within village government. The relations between village head, village 
parliament and village development committee could not work as it was arranged in the 
village structure. Village head was still too powerful and too dominants in the village 
governance. The establishment of village parliament after decentralization policy in 2001 
was still unable to make the power within village more balanced. Village parliament 
positioned themselves as farthest as to be the partner of village head while village 
development committees positioned themselves to be a subordinate of village head. Since 
decentralization requires that all rural institutions do their tasks and work together in the 
village governance without cultural barrier, an over domination of village head had in 
some extent hampered the possibility of success in solving local problems. 
These general problems are particularly interesting to refer to the relationships 
between power and local culture. In the name of decentralization policy, the central 
government has transferred the power to village government. Given the local Javanese 
culture in seeing village head as a father of community and as the highest patron where the 
traditional power should be obediently followed, village governance during decentralized 
system is not much changed from the previous traditional pattern. The village heads, 
supported by their officers, still dominated the village politics and prevented the other 
institutions such as village parliament, village development committee and neighborhood 
head to perform their role, either in controlling the village head, in consultation with the 
village head and in demanding an equal position in village meeting.  
Of course, this is not simply a cultural problem. Resources and support from the 
district government also matter. Among all rural institutions, it was only village head and 
his officers who got salary and organizationally had facilities. Village parliament, 
development committee, neighborhood groups were voluntary jobs receiving no 
incentives, thus it would be difficult to expect total devotion from them. Further, supports 
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from district government were so far given only to village head and officers. Village heads 
are the only institution legally accepted to represent the village with outsider, particularly 
district government. Thus, only village head who can develop network with the outsider. 
He had the best capacity among rural institutions, eliminating village parliament, 
development committee and neighborhood heads who struggle by themselves to 
understand complex issues of decentralization. 
 
7.5. Conclusions and Policy Implication 
Village government has good enough capacity to implement its respective tasks in 
rural development. Yet, realization of the capacity to address local problems is still limited, 
and only partial solution can be made. Weak coordination among rural institutions and 
limited budget availability are the major problem found in all study sites that hamper the 
realization of capacity to address local problems. Further, the district government has done 
limited efforts to develop the capacity of rural institutions. So far, it emphasizes more on 
capacity development for village officers while neighborhood group, village parliament 
and village development committee receives only little attention from the government.  
Such effort of capacity development was needed for neighborhood group, village 
parliament and village development committee. The most urgent one may be the capacity 
development of village parliament and village development committee, which can be done 
by socializing the regulations and training to foster community participation in village 
governance like facilitating community dialogue, public hearing and development 
planning. Technical trainings to address the livelihood problems, like those related to 
agriculture and environmental matters, are also strongly recommended. Besides that, it is 
important to increase transfer of funds from district to village government, so that village 
government has enough financial resources to overcome local problems. 
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Chapter 8 . Community Participation in the Decentralized Rural Development 
 
8.1. Introduction 
Decentralization has transferred to village government not only a power to execute, 
but also to plan and to evaluate village budget. It is obviously different from the state-led 
rural development system previously applied by New Order regime. During that time, rural 
development initiatives mostly came from the upper village levels and community acted 
more as an object of development (Antlöv, 2000; Bebbington et al., 2006; Evers, 2000; 
Widianingsih, 2005). According to Rasyid (2002), Indonesian decentralization aims to 
encourage local initiatives by placing the center of decision making at the lowest level of 
government. It is expected that community will not only become a program beneficiary but 
also as an active subject of rural development.  
Despite those expectations, the success of decentralization in promoting 
participatory development heavily depends on the mechanism offered by the regulation. At 
this point, a concern may arise to the viability of Indonesian decentralization to promote 
participatory rural development. This is because the existing decentralization laws explain 
more on transfer of power but less on mechanism to involve the community. Thus, the 
ways to involve community will depend on a locally made mechanism. 
This chapter aims to analyze whether decentralized system has facilitated 
community participation in rural development. The rest of this chapter is organized as 
follows: Section 8.2 will discuss mechanism of community participation at village level; 
Section 8.3 will discuss findings of this study, which mainly consist of discussion on 
community involvement in planning, execution and evaluation in the study villages; 
Section 8.4 will provide discussion; Section 8.5 will draw conclusions and policy 
implication. 
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8.2. Mechanism of Community Participation 
At the national level, the spirit of decentralization to promote participatory 
development is expressed in the Government Regulation 72/2005 on Village. This is the 
main implementing regulations of decentralization that specifically regulate the village 
government and rural development. In principle, the regulation mandates that village 
planning should be participative (Article 63.1). Village head should provide budget report 
to district government and village parliament, and should inform the villagers (article 
15.2). Further, the regulation does not elaborate a mechanism to involve the villagers, 
rather, it mandates district governments to make a guide for village government under their 
supervision (Article 66). 
The district government of Purbalingga has issued a guide on village budget 
management. This guide is made every year and legalized through a district head 
regulation (Peraturan Bupati). However, it is found that every year, the guide is seemingly 
always copied from the previous year without any change. The main essence of the guide 
is, among other, about stages in village budget management. According to the guide, the 
first stage of village budget execution is planning meeting to decide the utilization of 
village budget. The second stage is technical meeting in which the project team discusses 
the project technically. After the project is executed, the last stage is a responsibility 
meeting where the village head should present the project report. Further, it is stipulated 
that village meeting should be conducted by involving at least all members of village 
development committee, head of village parliament and one member dealing with 
development affairs, village officers, neighborhood heads and community prominent 
figures. 
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 Here, this study finds some conflict between the national regulation and the guide 
made by district government. The spirit of participatory development mandated by 
regulation 72/2005 is deviated by the implementing guide, which limits community 
involvement only to some selected institutions. Informal institutions, like farmer groups, 
religious groups and many other traditional groups where social capital within community 
exist, are not involved. The mechanism also makes impossible for villagers to be involved 
as an individual, not representation of a group, in a village decision making. 
 
8.3. Results 
8.3.1. Community Involvement in Planning 
Formalization of planning meeting was found in the study villages. It was 
conducted in the village office based on an invitation letter distributed to the attendant. The 
issue of formal invitation was decisive, because villagers could not join the meeting unless 
they were given an invitation letter. Especially for female household heads, obstacles 
discouraging their involvement were not only structural related to the formalization of 
meeting, but also cultural. When they were asked whether they would go or not if they 
received invitation, most of them preferred to stay at home rather than to attend the 
meeting. Their reasons varied from considering it as man’s business, the meeting was often 
held during the night that was customarily inappropriate for women to go out of home, or 
feeling not able to speak in front of public.  
Village head played a decisive role to decide who will be invited and how to 
conduct the meeting. In Serang, village head asked neighborhood heads to send five people 
from their neighborhoods to come to the village meeting. In Sumilir and Kedarpan, village 
head only invited neighborhood heads. This was quite different from Kedarpan, in which 
only the institution heads attended the village meeting. Based on interview with the 
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headman of Kedarpan, the main factor discouraging from applying open meeting was its 
inefficiency in terms of budget22. According to him, open meeting spent more operational 
costs to provide logistic for the attendants, something considered as wastefulness amidst 
village budget scarcity. However, this study argues that budget efficiency was not strong 
enough to be the main reason to reduce the number of meeting attendants. This could be 
seen from the case of Serang, in which the village head involved more villagers in the 
meeting. According to the headman of Serang, he preferred to invite many villagers to 
increase the legitimacy of the decision and to minimize the complaint from community23. 
In the end, it was clear that the decision whether to apply open or representation meeting 
was not strongly motivated by cost saving of village budget. The decentralized rural 
development, as well as the mechanism to involve community in village decision making, 
was practically executed in the environment where village head had decided a mechanism 
deemed better to involve the villagers.  
Respondent’s involvement in planning was significantly higher in Serang. In 
Serang, besides attended by the institution heads, the meeting was also attended by many 
villagers. Further, respondents in Kedarpan village were the least involved in planning 
meeting (Table 8.1).  
Villagers not invited in the village meeting might be still involved in planning in 
the neighborhood meeting where they were mostly just informed what the decision had 
made previously in village meeting. Indeed, participant observations find that the meeting 
at neighbor or hamlet level was more inclusive by involving more villagers24. In addition, 
the meeting was held in the informal atmosphere where letter of invitation was not applied. 
                                                          
22  Summarized from the interview with Kedarpan village head in 19 March 2011  
23  Summarized from the interview with Serang village head in 26 February 2011 
24  Observation and discussion in hamlet meeting in Bojongsari in 28 March 2011 
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The weaknesses of this meeting were because it functioned mostly only to disseminate 
information, not to make a decision.  
 
Table 8.1.  Respondent’s Involvement in Planning 
 
No Indicators 
Village 
P value  
Serang Kedarpan Sumilir Total 
1  Involved in planning  
    
0.00*** 
 
 Never  15(13) 20(33) 11(19) 46(20) 
 
 Rarely  25(22) 23(38) 17(29) 65(28) 
 
 Often  69(61) 14(23) 28(48) 111(48) 
 
 Always  4(4) 4(7) 2(3) 10(4) 
2  Generating idea in planning(n=186)  
    
0.11 
 
 Never  23(23) 5(12) 19(40) 47(25) 
 
 Rarely  51(52) 22(54) 22(47) 95(51) 
 
 Often  22(22) 13(32) 3(6) 38(20) 
 
 Always  2(2) 1(2) 3(6) 6(3) 
Source: Field survey 
Note: *, **, *** means significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
 
8.3.2. Community Involvement in Execution 
Villagers participated in project execution mainly by becoming paid workers, 
contributing cash or material and engaging in voluntary working. Voluntary working was 
the most preferred form of participation in project execution. Participation in Serang was 
significantly higher than in the other village (Table 8.2).  
Still related to resource mobilization, this study finds that the wage for village 
government sponsored projects was set below the standard. In Sumilir, the wage of a 
laborer in road asphalting project in 2010 was set at IDR 20,000 per day (the wage 
standard at that time was about IDR 24,500) while the wage of skilled mason was set at 
IDR 30,000 per day, compared to the wage standard of IDR 32,500. Data from several 
project documents in Kedarpan and Serang also confirmed similar phenomenon. Although 
considered unjust, it could ensure that the workers of government-sponsored projects were 
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poor households. The non-poor were reluctant to become workers in those projects since 
they still could earn more income from other jobs.  
 
Table 8.2. Respondent’s Involvement in Program Execution 
No Indicators 
Village 
P value  
Serang Kedarpan Sumilir Total 
1 Times of voluntary working a year  
    
0.00*** 
   Never  2(2) 3(5) 4(7) 9(4) 
   1-6 times  2(2) 9(15) 14(24) 25(11) 
   7-12 times  3(3) 32(53) 39(67) 74(32) 
   More than 12 times  104(94) 16(27) 1(2) 121(53) 
2 Days of becoming the paid worker a year  
    
0.260 
   Never  97(87) 47(78) 47(81) 191(83) 
   A day to 14 days  9(9) 7(12) 7(12) 23(10) 
   15 days to one month  4(4) 6(10) 2(3) 6(6) 
   More than a month  1(1) 0(0) 2(3) 3(1) 
3 Amount of cash/material contribution a year (IDR)  
    
0.140 
   None  69(62) 44(73) 39(67) 152(66) 
   < 100,000  23(21) 9(15) 17(29) 49(21) 
   101,000 - 500,000  14(13) 5(8) 1(2) 20(9) 
 
 > 500,000  5(5) 2(3) 1(2) 8(3) 
Source: Field survey 
Note: *, **, *** means significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
Community participation in project execution should ideally be a voluntary action 
selected by each villager. However, there were cases where community contribution was 
coercive, for example by cutting the salary of worker to add the amount of cash 
contribution. In some cases, the workers were made unaware that their salary was cut due 
to un-accessibility of budget document. The example was in the road-building project of 
Kedarpan village in 2007. At the time, worker’s wage was reduced by IDR 1,500 from the 
wage of IDR 18,500 per day per worker to be counted as cash contribution. The village 
government should do this to reduce the expenses since the community insisted the village 
government to lengthen the road up to about 1 kilometer while the available fund was only 
about IDR 81 million, which was only enough for building a road with a length of 600 
meter25. Of course, this case was not simply an issue of coercive mobilization since it was 
                                                          
25  Interview with the LKMD head in Kedarpan Village, in 19 March 2011 
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also respond to community insistence to lengthen the project quantity. From the other 
perspective, this case could also be regarded as a method to seek a way out of the problem 
on fund limitedness.  
It was also found that decentralizing rural development to village government led to 
a more efficient spending in obtaining building material, especially in Serang and 
Kedarpan (Table 8.3). The expenses in infrastructure development were cheaper compared 
to the standard of price set by district government in the same year for respective area26. 
Village government could obtain them from the producer directly with a cheaper price. 
This was different from the district government sponsored projects where registered 
supplier supplied the material. 
 
Table 8.3.  Cost of Some Building Materials in Rural Development in Serang, Kedarpan 
and Sumilir, 2010 
 
No 
Material 
building 
Serang (madrassa building) Kedarpan (river bank improvement) Sumilir (road improvement) 
The cost 
spent by 
the 
village 
The price 
standard set 
by 
government 
for this area 
Comparison 
of cost  
The 
cost 
spent 
by the 
village 
The price 
standard set 
by 
government 
for this area 
Comparison 
of cost 
The cost 
spent by 
the 
village 
The price 
standard set 
by 
government 
for this area 
Comparison 
of cost 
1 
Stone for 
foundation 
70.000 93.500 25% lower    81.430 81.430 Same 
2 
Stone (2/3 
size) 
195.000 198.000 2% lower    167.475 167.475 Same 
3 
Stone (5/7 
size) 
      96.290 96.290 Same 
4 
Stone (3/5 
size) 
      103.375 103.375 Same 
5 
Stone (10/15 
size) 
   67.500 67.570 Same    
6 
Sand for 
mortar 
160.000 165.185 3% lower 65.500 76.810 15% lower 80.850 80.800 Same 
7 Sand fill 55.000 60.060 8% lower    69.300 69.300 Same 
8 Land fill 45.000 60.060 25% lower 53.000 58.330 9% lower    
9 Brick/clinker 400 440 9% lower    450 440 2% higher 
10 Concrete tile 1.100 1.100 Same       
11 
Wage of 
laborer 
20.000 24.500 18% lower 20.000 24.500 18% lower 20.000 24.500 18% lower 
12 
Wage of 
skilled mason 
30.000 32.500 8% lower 30.000 32.500 8% lower 30.000 32.500 8% lower 
Source:  Kedarpan Village Government (2010), Serang Village Government (2010), Sumilir Village Government (2010) 
 
                                                          
26  Every year, the district government issues a regulation on the standard of price for government 
expenses. The standard is set differently into four categories of areas by considering the 
difficulty of location and transportation. 
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8.3.3. Community Involvement in Evaluation 
Decentralizing rural development to village government aimed to increase 
community control to development funds. For this objective, transparency in the fund 
utilization was compulsory to create government accountability. Yet, in general, this study 
finds that budget transparency was not well practiced. Such practice to present a report in 
public information board was not always conducted. The public information boards in 
village offices were not updated. For example in Sumilir village office, during a work visit 
in January 2012, a public information board in the office was still presenting some general 
information about 2010 village budget. The responsibility meeting, which was supposed to 
be a forum to present the fund utilization and to hand over the outputs to community, was 
not always implemented. Thus, it was therefore not surprising that most respondents (80%) 
stated that they were never/rarely informed about fund utilization. Here, again, respondents 
in Serang were significantly more informed than the other villages (Table 8.4).  
 
Table 8.4.  Respondent’s Involvement in Evaluation 
No Indicators 
Village 
P value  
Serang Kedarpan Sumilir Total 
1  Informed about utilization of fund  
    
0.042* 
 
 Never  31(27) 19(31) 26(45) 76(33) 
 
 Rarely  62(55) 24(39) 25(43) 111(48) 
 
 Often  16(14) 17(28) 6(10) 39(17) 
 
 Always  4(4) 1(2) 1(2) 6(3) 
Source: Field survey 
Note: *, **, *** means significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
Although in many cases the utilization of fund was not reported to community, this 
study finds that actually all the three villages always made a project report, but they kept it 
safe in the office and submitted only to the district government via sub-district head. Thus, 
the village governments still orientated their accountability to the upper government level 
rather than to the community.  
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To where the village government would be accountable was related to an issue on 
power relation. So far, community had no power to hold the village head accountable and 
transparent to them. On the other hand, although in decentralized system there was no 
direct command line from district to village government, the former was still powerful to 
the later. The other reason was the incentives of giving report to district government. If 
village government was failed to submit the report on time, the district government would 
delay transfer of fund as well as give punishment by reducing the amount of the next year 
transfer. The existence of punishment motivated the village heads to submit report 
routinely, as it would also show that village government could execute the project well. 
The punishment itself was a crucial threat because up to now, the main source of village 
budget was transfer from district government. Although village government could look for 
internal revenues, no one of the study villages was able to earn. Facilities like village 
market and motorcycle pedicab pool, from which village governments could impose 
charge, or village government’s enterprises that could provide profit, were not available in 
the study villages.  
Open complain from villagers was limited. Not all villagers especially the poor had 
the bravery to make protest since they did not want to be regarded as troublemakers or 
were afraid that it would cause troublesome when they administered official letters in the 
village office. Some indirect protests were expressed through a reluctance to join the 
village government sponsored activities. Villagers themselves unintentionally developed 
some kind of tolerance to fund misusing. They might sometimes be aware that several 
projects suffer from corruption just by seeing their construction quality or by comparing to 
the other projects using the same amount of fund. As far as they thought it was only a petty 
corruption, they would not openly complain. Among the study villages, there was a case of 
fund misusing reported in Serang in 2007. At that time, the village development team was 
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suspected to misuse about IDR 10 million from village budget. Since public complain 
resulted in no settlement at village level, community then reported it to sub-district head. 
Instead of bringing the case to the police for legal settlement, the sub-district head 
preferred to issue administrative sanction for the doers and to ask them to return the fund. 
The case was closed in 2008 after the doers returned the fund.  
 
8.4. Discussion 
Literatures argue that direct participation is better than representation system. In 
this regard, decentralization is promoted based on an assumption that the more local a 
power is executed, the higher is its potentiality to promote direct participation, inclusive 
decision making, optimum resource mobilization as well as better accountability and 
transparency. However, it is indeed recognized a considerable scope for enhancing a direct 
participation. For example, just in a village of 500 households, it is seen that direct 
participation in every moment of public decision-making is impossible. Thus, 
representation mechanism was unavoidable to overcome this problem. 
Blair (2000), through his review on decentralization practices in Bolivia, Honduras, 
India, Mali, the Philippines and Ukraine, finds that a real participatory development will be 
achieved only if decentralization involved as many citizens as possible in decision making. 
Further, when a direct participation is seen impossible due to the area size and number of 
population, he suggests that the regulation should guarantee the participation of 
marginalized groups in the established representation system. He also suggests that 
accountability of local government should not rely only on formal mechanism, but also 
through informal mechanism.  
What happening in Indonesia, especially in Purbalingga district, is an opposite of 
the suggestion made by Blair. The spirit of participatory rural development mandated by 
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the national regulations is deviated by a locally established mechanism made by district 
government. While Blair (2000) suggests that the marginal groups should be guaranteed in 
public decision making, the procedure made by Purbalingga district conversely mandates 
the formal institutions like village parliament and development committee to be the core 
institution in village meetings. By only making compulsory for village head to involve 
formal institution, then informal institutions and marginalized groups have been excluded 
from the village meeting. Informal institutions where most villagers actively becoming the 
members, like farmer groups, religious group and many other traditional groups, are not 
involved. Less involvement of informal institutions creates problems of representativeness. 
As this study has presented, the ways to seek community participation in the study 
villages is through formal method. The formalization of village meeting, which has 
become the obstacle of inclusive participation, is also seen the results of the current 
administrative reporting system. Village government needs letter of invitation, signature, 
bill of meeting logistic and so on to be the proof of spending submitted to district 
government. This also seems to be the structural barrier inherited from the New Order 
policy to bureaucratize the village governance. 
Indeed, regulation is not the only factor influencing the success of decentralization 
in promoting participatory development. It is found that leadership of village head is 
another influencing factor in promotion of community participation. In a condition where 
village head is still the most powerful actor within village, the way of involving people 
depends on his inclination.  
It is also found that the mechanism of accountability emphasizes more on formal 
method, especially through reports to district government and village parliament. The 
study villages do not use informal methods like presentation to the villagers directly or 
indirectly through public board. The formalization and upward orientation of 
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accountability of village government implies that lack of community control over village 
government. As an impact, community involvement is currently just a pseudo-participation 
emphasizing more on the resource mobilization but less in planning and evaluation.  
 
8.5. Conclusions and Policy Implication 
The spirit of participatory development mandated by decentralization laws is 
deviated by the locally established mechanism of participation. Thus, Indonesian 
decentralization has not completely facilitated a real participatory development. 
Community was involved more in the project execution, but less in planning and in 
evaluation.  
Decentralized system requires more than just transferring power on planning, 
execution and evaluation to village government. Perhaps more important, there should be a 
general guide on the way to involve villagers and the mechanism of complain by 
considering local social and political context. Regulation should oblige village government 
to involve informal institutions and the marginal groups in village decision making. 
Further, the district government should monitor the implementation of this regulation.
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Chapter 9 . Rural Poverty Alleviation during Decentralization  
 
9.1.  Introduction 
During the New Order regime, Indonesia experienced remarkable reduction in 
poverty rate. From 1968-1997, the headcount poverty was declined from 60% to 17% of 
population (BPS et al., 2001). Although being impressive achievement, the government at 
that time had no specific poverty alleviation programs. The reduced levels of poverty were 
attributable to heavy price subsidies and benefits of Green Revolution (BPS et al., 2001; 
Manning, 1988) 
The 1998 economic crisis reversed many economic gains made by the regime. With 
weakened financial position, the government was not able to continue most subsidy 
programs. Further, with the devolution of power through decentralization policy, the gov-
ernment changed its strategy on poverty alleviation, moving away from price subsidies to 
programs directly targeting the poor.  
This chapter aims to measure their targeting effectiveness and impacts on some 
selected poverty indicators. In addition, this study will also discuss the changes in some 
selected sectors at district and village level. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: 
Section 9.2 will discuss changes in some sectors at district level; Section 9.3 will discuss 
change in some poverty indicators at village level; Section 9.5 will present changes in 
poverty indicators at household. This section will consist several sub-sections presenting 
programs and poverty indicators used in impact measurement; targeting effectiveness of 
selected programs; change in socio-economic condition of respondents and case studies on 
some selected respondents; Section 9.6 will provide discussion; Section 9.7 will draw 
conclusion and policy implication. 
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9.2. Changes in Some Sectors at District Level 
As it has been discussed in Chapter 5, Agriculture, infrastructure, health and 
education constituted the most important sectors in rural development. In agriculture 
sector, the irrigation was relying on 159 dams built by the New Order regime during 1970s 
to 1980s, in which 25 of them were seriously damaged. The length of technical irrigation 
channel before and after decentralized system was relatively same, only increased by about 
19 km. Enlargement of irrigation coverage was done only through small-scale irrigation 
channels built by village governments. Their scope was often very small, with length less 
than 1 km. As an impact, rice production was relatively stagnant over the years. Further, 
growth of GDP of agriculture sector during decentralized system was getting slower than 
before (Figure 9.1). 
 
 
Figure 9.1. Irrigation network, production of paddy and the growth of GRDP of 
agriculture sector in Purbalingga district, 1991-2010 
Source: (BPS Purbalingga, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005) 
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In infrastructure sector, from about 710 km of total district road, data in 2010 show 
that 95% of them were asphalted, or an increase from 52% in 2000. Yet, by 2010, only 
45% of them were in good condition. With regard to clean water facilities, up to 2010, 
about 79% of households accessed clean water, compared to that of 31% in 2000 (Figure 
9.2).  
 
 
Figure 9.2. Road and clan water development in Purbalingga district, 1991-2010 
Source: (BPS Purbalingga, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005) 
 
With regard to health sector, up to 2010, the district government has built about 21 
new village policlinics. Further, about 43% of households were covered by the social 
health insurance. The impact of development of health sector can be seen from several key 
indicators like infant mortality rate, mother mortality rate, and life expectancy rate. It is 
found that life expectancy increased over the years while infant mortality rate seems 
stagnant, and mother mortality rate seems fluctuating (Figure 9.3).  
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Figure 9.3. Health indicators in Purbalingga, 1991-2010 
Source: (BPS Purbalingga, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005) 
 
With regard to education sector, from 2001 to 2010, the district government built 
113 new kindergartens, 21 new lower secondary schools and 45 new upper secondary 
schools. Net Enrolment Ratio (NER) of lower secondary school has considerably increased 
during decentralized system. However, NER of elementary school and upper secondary 
school seems does not show significant increase (Figure 9.4). 
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Figure 9.4. Education indicators in Purbalingga, 1991-2010 
Source: (BPS Purbalingga, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005) 
 
 
9.3. Changes in Some Indicators at Village Level 
Prior to the decentralized system, some basic rural infrastructures had been 
available. For example, in physical infrastructure, the main village road was passable by 
cars, but mainly from dirt. In education sector, primary schools existed in each village, but 
secondary schools were only available in sub-district. In health sector, the villagers mainly 
accessed medical treatment in the sub-district health centre. Electricity network existed in 
each village, but the irrigation only existed in Sumilir village.  
During decentralization, village polyclinic, kindergarten, asphalt road and clean 
water facilities were built from village budget. Moreover, there were currently some 
women saving groups received capital assistance from village budget. Although some 
infrastructures were improved, villager’s still have difficulties to access market, bus 
terminal, bank, post office, low and high secondary schools and more completed health 
centre. Those facilities were available only in sub-district, and the distance was about 5 km 
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from Serang, 2 km from Kedarpan, and 3 km from Sumilir. Due to inexistence of public 
transportation, the villagers can only access them on foot or private vehicle (Table 9.1). 
 
 Table 9.1. Change in Village Infrastructure 
No Infrastructure  
Serang Kedarpan Sumilir 
2000 2011 2000 2011 2000 2011 
1 
 Physical infrastructure        
- Passable road (asphalt: 
total)  
7:36 km 26:36 km 0.5:7 km 5:7.5 km 1.3: 6.9 
km 
4.8:6.9 
km 
- Clean water supply  - 3 unites 2 unites 5 unites - - 
2 
Agricultural facilities       
- Irrigation channel - - - - 3 km 3 km 
3 
 Education facilities        
- Kindergarten  - 5 schools - 2 schools - 2 schools 
- Primary school  6 schools 6 schools 2 schools 2 schools 2 schools 2 schools 
- Low secondary school  1 school 1 school - - - - 
4 
 Health facilities        
- Village polyclinic  - 1 unit - 1 unit - 1 unit 
- Village health post 8 unites 8 unites 3 unites 3 unites 3 unites 3 unites 
5 
 Financial institution        
- Women saving group  - 5 groups - 3 groups - 3 groups 
-  Cooperation  1 coop 2 coops - - - - 
Source: Field survey, 2012 
 
9.4. Changes in Poverty Indicators at Household Level 
9.4.1. Programs and Poverty Indicators 
The government strategy to alleviate poverty is implemented through three clusters 
of programs. The programs having wide coverage and funding, as identified by Daly and 
Fane (2002), as follows:  
1. Cluster of Social Protection, which consists of individual targeting programs to 
distribute basic needs to the poor. This cluster consists of several key programs, as 
follows:  
a. Program of Rice for the Poor (Raskin), which distributes about 15 kg of 
subsidized rice per household per month;  
110 
 
b. Program of Health Insurance for the Poor (Askeskin), which provides a card of 
free basic medication for the poor in a government clinic;  
c. Program of Poor House Renovation (PPHR), which gives the funds to the poor 
people for house renovation. 
2. Cluster of Community Driven Development, which consists of programs to improve 
infrastructure in poor villages. This cluster consists of several key programs, as 
follows:  
a. National Program for Community Empowerment (NPCE), which delivers grant 
from central government;  
b. Program of Village Allocation Fund (PVAF), which distributes the grant from 
district government.  
3. Cluster of Small Enterprise Development, which consists of programs to provide loans 
for the poor without collaterals. The prominent one is the Program of Woman Saving 
Group (PWSG), which distributes funds to rural women in a microfinance arrangement. 
 
Further, in Indonesia, the poor is identified based on fourteen indicators determined 
by the statistical agency. These indicators reflect an increasing acknowledge to see poverty 
as not only problem of income but also education, health, dwelling, asset and access to 
public service. Those meeting at least nine indicators are eligible to receive social protection 
programs and should be prioritized to the other programs. The indicators are as follows: 
1. The education of household head is elementary or less;  
2. The floor area is less than 8 m2 per capita;  
3. The floor is dirt or rudimentary;  
4. The wall is bamboo, poor wood or un-cemented brick;  
5. Having no private toilet;  
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6. Having no electricity;  
7. Having no clean water facilities;  
8. Cooking fuel is wood or kerosene;  
9. Not able to pay medical cost;  
10. Only able to consume meat or milk once a week;  
11. Only able to take meal twice a day;  
12. Only able to buy new clothes once a year;  
13. Having no asset worth than IDR 500,000;  
14. Having income less than IDR 600,000 per month.  
 
The study framework to analyze impact of decentralized rural development on 
poverty alleviation is as Figure 9.5. 
 
Figure 9.5. Framework to Analyze Program Impact on Poverty Alleviation 
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9.4.2. Targeting Effectiveness 
By referring to the indicators set by the government, this study identified that totally 
81 respondents consisting of 34 respondents in Serang, 25 respondents in Kedarpan and 22 
respondents in Sumilir were eligible to the programs. However, the real number of 
beneficiaries of many programs did not match with those criteria. Some programs suffered 
from leakage, which means that they were distributed to the non-eligible. On contrary, some 
programs suffered from under-coverage, which means that those eligible did not become the 
beneficiaries.  
Social protection suffered from both leakage and under-coverage. Program of Raskin 
suffered from leakage, as the rice was distributed not only to the eligible villagers, but also to 
almost all the villagers. The interviewed village officers said that the rice was equally 
distributed to prevent social jealousness from the non-recipients. Some 94% of the total 
respondents received rice from this program monthly. As a result, the amount of rice that the 
poor received was less than what it should be. Program of Askeskin delivered to the poor a 
card for free basic medication in government clinic for a year. Some 40% of the respondents 
received free health cards from the program. There was almost no leakage in this program 
because the name of recipients was printed on the identification card issued by the Statistical 
Agency, which was necessary to access the services. However, the program suffered from 
under-coverage, as some of the poor respondents did not become the beneficiaries. PPHR 
provided funds to renovate about five poor houses annually, amounting to IDR 2.5 million 
per house. The same as Askeskin, PPHR also suffered from the under-coverage. Only 16% of 
the respondents had ever received the fund, and many of the eligible were still in a waiting 
list. Because of limited funds, only small amounts could be disbursed. Most of them used the 
money to improve floors of their homes.  
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NPCE and PVAF distributed grants to village government annually by considering 
the landmass, population and prevalence of poverty. The village of Serang, Kedarpan and 
Sumilir received about IDR 256 million, 152 million and 180 million in 2010, respectively 
(Kedarpan Village Government, 2010; Serang Village Government, 2010; Sumilir Village 
Government, 2010). However, disbursed amounts, according to village heads, were not large 
enough for rural infrastructure development. Annual budget reports show that the largest 
share of the grant was used for road improvement, followed by irrigation, clean water 
facilities and school building.  
The PWSG provided an alternative source of loan for the villagers to develop small 
business. It distributed funds to women groups to be utilized as revolving credit, amounting 
to IDR 10 million per group (Purbalingga District Government, 2010b). There were five 
women groups in Serang, 3 groups in Kedarpan and Sumilir that received the PWSG funds. 
Because of limited funds, the amount of loan that clients could borrow was small. 
For example, in one hamlet of Kedarpan, the head of a women’s group said that her group 
reached a consensus to limit the loan at IDR 500,000 with interest rate was 10%. About 92% 
respondents had borrowed money from the program. However, there were no criteria used to 
determine who is eligible to apply for the loan. Thus, the wealthier became clients of the 
program while some of the poor had never accessed the loan because of high interest rate and 
fear of not being able to repay the loans. 
Despite all of those leakages and under coverage, this study does not find association 
between miss targeting and kinship relation with village government. The reason of the 
leakage was that using the criteria set by government, the differentiation between the poor 
and non-poor was often so slight. “Everybody here is poor”, was commonly expressed by 
respondents when talking about distribution of programs. Thus, equal distribution was done 
to prevent social jealousness and to maintain village harmony.  
 114 
 
Table 9.2. Kinship Relation and Distribution of the Programs  
Eligibility 
Name of 
programs 
Kinship relation 
with village 
officers 
Beneficiaries? 
P Value 
No Yes 
Eligible 
Raskin 
No 0 67 
 Yes 0 14 
Askeskin 
No 24 43 
0.049** 
Yes 9 5 
PPHR 
No 50 17 
0.804 
Yes 10 4 
PWSG 
No 9 58 
0.515 
Yes 1 13 
Non eligible 
Raskin 
No 8 92 
0.266 
Yes 7 44 
Askeskin 
No 67 33 
0.299 
Yes 39 12 
PPHR 
No 90 10 
0.97 
Yes 46 5 
PWSG 
No 4 96 
0.319 
Yes 4 47 
Source: Field Survey, 2012 
Note: *, **, *** means significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
9.4.3. Changes in the Socio Economic Condition of Respondents 
By 2012, there were still many respondents falling under poverty in term of food, 
health access and dwelling condition. With regard to food dimension, there were 25 
respondents (11%) having difficulty take meal twice a day and 184 respondents (79%) not 
able to consume meat more than once a week. With regard to access to health service, there 
were still 63 respondents (27%) not able to pay medical cost when getting sick. With regard 
to dwelling condition, there were 35 respondents (15%) still using mud or rudimentary floor, 
115 respondent (50%) using bamboo, poor wood or un-cemented brick wall, 126 
respondents (54%) having no private toilet, and 183 respondents (79%) still cooking with 
firewood. Even though there were some beneficiaries escaping from poverty indicators, their 
number were lesser than the non-beneficiaries. This means that social protection programs 
have no significant impact on poverty alleviation. 
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With regard to access to public services, by 2012, there were still 139 respondents 
(60%) and 73 respondents (31%) having no access to clean water and electricity, 
respectively. Indeed, among 227 respondents having no access to clean water in 2000, 19% 
were having clean water facilities in 2012. Out of 106 respondents having no access to 
electricity in 2000, 31% were having access to electricity in 2012. The changes are 
statistically significant, except change in electricity access in Kedarpan. Observations shows 
that district waterworks did not exist except some small clean water facilities in few 
neighborhoods. Electricity networks had existed in each village before decentralization. 
Therefore, it is fair to say that the inability of some respondents to access electricity was due 
to the respondent’s financial difficulties while the low access to clean water facilities was 
due to limited infrastructure.  
With regard to income and asset, by 2012, there were still 90 respondents (39%) 
having income less than IDR 600,000 per month, and 39 respondents (17%) having asset less 
than IDR 500,000. After about twelve years of decentralization, incomes of the poor 
respondents were not much improved. There were only nine respondents moving out the 
income poverty. Most of the improvements were the asset of the poor where 39 poor 
respondents could increase their asset to worth more than IDR 500,000. Comparing between 
the beneficiaries and the non-beneficiaries of PWSG, this study finds the significant 
difference only in asset of the poor (Table 9.3). 
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Table 9.3. Change in Some Selected Poverty Indicators, 2000 - 2012 
Poverty indicator Program beneficiaries? 
Respondents 
meeting poverty 
indicator 
Chang
e 
P value 
2000 2012 
Only able to take meal twice a 
day  
Beneficiaries of Raskin 29 25 4 (14)  
0.023**  
Non beneficiaries of Raskin 1 0 1 (100)  
Only able to consume meat once 
a week  
Beneficiaries of Raskin 207 176 31 (15)  
0.273  
Non beneficiaries of Raskin 11 8 3 (27)  
Not able to pay medical cost  
Beneficiaries of Askeskin 50 39 11 (22)  
0.175  Non beneficiaries of 
Askeskin 
37 24 13 (35)  
Mud housing floor  
Beneficiaries of PPHR 30 11 19 (63)  
0.679  
Non beneficiaries of PPHR 74 24 50 (68)  
Bamboo/poor wood/un-cemented 
brick wall  
Beneficiaries of PPHR 36 35 1 (3)  
0.00***  
Non beneficiaries of PPHR 145 80 65 (45)  
No private toilet  
Beneficiaries of PPHR 35 30 5 (14)  
0.007***  
Non beneficiaries of PPHR 155 96 59 (36)  
Cooking with wood/kerosene  
Beneficiaries of PPHR 36 31 5 (14)  
0.289  
Non beneficiaries of PPHR 194 152 42 (22)  
No access to clean water  
Serang  113 101 12 (11)  0.000***  
Kedarpan  56 38 18 (32)  0.000***  
Sumilir  58 45 13 (22)  0.000***  
No access to electricity  
Serang  54 36 18 (33)  0.000***  
Kedarpan  18 14 4 (22)  0.219  
Sumilir  34 23 11 (32)  0.001***  
Income less than IDR 600,000 
per month  
Beneficiaries of PWSG 87 79 8 (9)  0.922  
Non beneficiaries of PWSG 12 11 1 (8)    
Asset worth not more than IDR 
500,000  
Beneficiaries of PWSG 73 39 34 (47)  0.021***  
Non beneficiaries of PWSG 5 0 5 (100)    
Source: Field Survey (2012) 
Note: *, **, *** means significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
 
9.4.4. Case Studies of Some Selected Respondents 
The general impact of poverty alleviation programs have been presented in the 
previous chapter. In addition, it is still necessary to understand the specific impact of those 
programs at household level. For this purpose, in-depth interview with some selected 
villagers has been conducted. The case studies are presented in the following sub sections. 
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9.4.4.1. Case of Mr. Tugiyo, a Coconut Sugar Maker 
Mr. Tugiyo, at age of 38 years, had a totally three family members consisting of 
wife and two children at elementary schools. He was a maker of coconut sugar by utilizing 
his sixteen coconut threes. Every day he incised and boiled the sap to make sugar, from 
which he could make about three kilogram of sugar worth at IDR 21,000. Becoming a 
coconut sugar maker, he practically could not develop a side job since he spent all the day 
for incision, boiling and looking for firewood. His wife had an additional income source to 
become the maker of fake eyelash, from which she earned about IDR 8000 a day. Having 
dirt floor, wall bamboo, no clean water facilities as well as electricity, he was easily 
recognized to be a poor household. His only liquid asset was an old motorbike worth at 
about IDR 4 million. 
He was the beneficiaries of social protection programs, except PPHR. From Raskin 
program, every month he received about 8 kg of rice. This amount was just half of the 
amount that he formally reserved to receive, 15 kg. Although he knew that the rice was 
reduced, he saw it as not a serious problem since he also considered the feeling of the other 
villagers who did not become official beneficiaries. Thanks to Raskin program, he told that 
he did not experience serious food insecurity in the last year. He also received a card of 
free basic medication from Askeskin program. By bringing the card, his family could have 
a free medication in sub-district polyclinic when getting sick. In 2011, he counted that he 
used the card about three times. He had never received the fund of PPHR. He actually 
really wanted to receive the fund to improve the house. He even questioned why he, as a 
poor household, did not yet receive the program while those having relatively better 
economy had received. What he could do was only to wait that might be in the future he 
will got the fund from PPHR.  
 118 
 
He had never accessed the loan from PWSG since according to him, it would only 
create additional financial burden. If cash was needed, he preferred to borrow to a 
middleman of his coconut sugar. According to him, proposing loan to the middleman was 
relatively easier, and he could repay just by selling the sugar to him.  
He might be among the most marginalized group within his village. Due to his far 
house location from a main road, he was not benefitted from infrastructure development. 
For example, although the neighborhood built a clean water facility, he could not access 
since the pipe did not reach his house. Similar case happened when he want to access 
electricity. From 2000 to 2012, the changes in his economic condition were the owning of 
a second hand motor bike bought in 2005 and the improvement of his foundation to 
concrete stone in 2008. However, these changes were not attributable to the existing 
poverty alleviation programs.  
 
9.4.4.2. Case of Mr. Santo, a Farmer 
Mr. Santo, at age of 50 years, had a big family to maintain. He had wife, one child 
at elementary school and one mother-in-law. In addition, there was his son at age 28 years, 
his daughter-in-law and a granddaughter in Mr. Santo’s house. He was poor as it could be 
easily seen from his house condition. The material used for wall was bamboo, and the floor 
was just rudimentary. He had access to electricity and clean water since before 
decentralization. As a farmer, his family only had 0.2 ha of dry cropland where he planted 
coconut, coffee and some wood trees. Income from farming was less than enough to 
support his daily needs. Thus, he also worked in the other’s land and sometimes became a 
labor in construction projects. His wife and son were engaged in various income 
generations like becoming labor and migrant. 
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He was a beneficiary of all social protection programs. From Raskin program, every 
month he received about 6 kg of rice. He told that he had never faced serious food 
insecurity in the last year, thanks to the program of Raskin. Further, he received a card of 
free basic medication from the Askeskin program. By bringing the card, his family could 
have a free medication in the sub-district polyclinic when getting sick. However, he told 
that the service and drug quality he received when using the card was not good, thus, 
sometimes he did not use it. In 2012, when his granddaughter was born, he needed 
additional money for paying the medication and conducting some birth rituals. Having no 
cash on the hand, he proposed a loan to PWSG, amounting to IDR 500,000. Thus, in his 
case, the aim of PWSG to be the capital assistance for developing business was not 
achieved. Up to the time of interview, the repayment of the loan was not finished yet. 
When he was asked whether he would propose loan on the future to develop a business, he 
answered that he might not borrow again. According to him, PWSG interest rate was too 
high, about 15%, which was higher than a loan given by the usurer. 
The only change in his economic condition from 2000 to 2012 was the floor 
condition, from dirt to rudimentary due to PPHR. He received that fund in 2007, 
amounting to IDR 2,500,000. With some additional fund from selling a goat, he could 
improve his floor and kitchen.  
 
9.4.4.3. Case of Mrs. Mayeng, a Chicken Trader 
Ms. Mayeng was a widow, 55 years old, with three family members. Her first 
daughter, at age 25 years, worked in Jakarta. Her second son, at age 20 years, worked as 
labor, and sometimes went to Jakarta to find job. Her last son was still age of 12 years, a 
student in elementary school. She lived in a house with wooden wall and rudimentary 
floor. She had no clean water facilities, and getting electricity power through illegal 
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connection to his kinship. She had no cropland, and her income mainly came from chicken 
trading in market and remittance from her daughter.  
She was a beneficiary of Raskin, Askeskin and PWSG, but not PPHR. From Raskin 
program, she received about 6 kg per month. She also a beneficiary of Askeskin program, 
and she had used that card to get health service in government polyclinics. She had not 
received fund from PPHR although she really wanted to. While not benefitting from 
PPHR, she was benefitted more from the PWSG. She counted that she had accessed the 
loan from PWSG three times, totally amounting to about 2 million rupiah. She used the 
money to supplement the capital of her trading. She actually expected that PWSG provided 
more many funds for women. In her experience, the fund from PWSG was very helpful, 
especially when her original capital was decreased. If she program could provide more 
funds and its interest rate was decreased, then she thought to be able to increase the profit. 
From 2000 to 2012, there were some changes in her economy. Her floor was 
improved from dirt to rudimentary. She also had a color television, which she bought in 
2007. However, these changes were not attributable to PWSG. Her daughter gave her the 
money to improve the house as well as to buy the television.  
 
9.5. Discussion 
At district level, indicators of some sectors show mixed results. Positive impact of 
decentralization can be easily identified in access to clean water, road development, 
coverage of health insurance, number of village policlinic, kindergarten and upper secondary 
schools, and NER of lower secondary school. In contrary, GDP growth of agriculture sector 
and NER of elementary school are decreased. Findings in Purbalingga district are consistent 
with study by World Bank (2007), which finds that there is no clear trend on impact of 
decentralization in quality of public service.  
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At community level, although most programs suffered from leakage and under 
coverage, rural elite capture did not happen, as there is no association between miss targeting 
and kinship relation with the rural elite. The actual reason of this leakage was that using the 
criteria set by government, differentiation between the poor and non-poor was often so 
slight. Thus, equal distribution prevents social jealousness and maintains village harmony.  
At household level, poverty can be categorized based on degree of severity. Those 
who still face problems of food insecurity and poor dwelling condition might be the poorest 
group within the community. They need intensive government programs to move out of 
poverty. Social protection like Raskin, Askeskin and PPHR is by design targeted to this 
group. This study argues that only if social protection is successful in achieving its stated 
objectives, then the poorest people can take advantage of other programs. However, the 
leakage in targeting as observed in Raskin program where the rice was distributed to all the 
villagers, and under coverage as observed in Askeskin and PPHR program, had made these 
programs not able to achieve their objective completely. 
NPCE and PVAF have indeed improved the infrastructure in the study villages. 
Further, changes in access to electricity and clean water facilities were also significant. 
However, here too, it cannot be simply concluded that the poorest group benefitted from the 
existing infrastructure. Closer observation finds that that it is usually the non-poor who could 
access clean water and electricity. The poor usually does not consider infrastructure 
development as a priority. 
In case of cluster of small enterprise development (PWSG), nearly half of the poor 
respondents were able to increase their assets worth to over IDR 500,000. However, in terms 
of income generation it could not meet its objective, as the loan could not be delivered to the 
poor effectively due to leakage in targeting and inadequate funding. It can also be said that 
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PWSG only prevented beneficiaries from falling deeply into poverty but not enable them 
escape poverty. 
 
9.6. Conclusions and Policy Implication 
At district level, sectoral indicators show mixed results. Positive impact of 
decentralization is found mostly in term of physical infrastructure. At household level, most 
of poverty alleviation programs suffer from under coverage due to insufficient funding. 
Program of Health Insurance for the Poor (Askeskin) and Program of Poor House Renovation 
(PPHR) suffered from serious under coverage. Further, some programs distributing kinds in 
hand like program of Rice for the Poor (Raskin) and Program of Woman Saving Group 
(PWSG) suffer from leakage because the kinds are distributed to almost all villagers. Despite 
of some miss targeting, there is no association between kinship relation with village officers 
and this miss targeting. Thus, the miss targeting is more due to the principle of solidarity 
within the rural community. Further, the under coverage as well as leakage of the programs 
make them not able to achieve their objective to alleviate poverty. Only rural infrastructure 
development significantly improves respondent’s access to some selected public service.  
To ensure that the poorest groups are benefitted from decentralization, the 
government should improve the targeting mechanism in poverty alleviation, especially social 
protection and microfinance clusters. As Indonesia is a diverse country, the government 
should not strictly impose any national standard to identify the eligible household. It may be 
worth if the government involve community in identifying the program beneficiaries, as it 
will provide an opportunity to develop a local flexibility in defining the poor households.  
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Chapter 10 . Conclusion and Policy Recommendation 
 
10.1. Conclusion 
By conducting a case study in Purbalingga district, more specifically in villages of 
Serang, Kedarpan and Sumilir, this study has tried to understand the nature of 
implementation of decentralization in Indonesia. Using an approach of policy phases 
starting from policy formulation especially in budgeting, policy implementation by 
underlining the existence and role of social capital, capacity of village government and 
community participation, and policy impact on poverty alleviation, this study identifies 
either bottlenecks or strength of each stage.  
In district budgeting process, findings in Purbalingga district are contrary with an 
expectation that decentralization will improve budget responsiveness. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, portion of expenditure for rural development in Purbalingga district, especially 
for agriculture and infrastructure sector, is low. The transferred financial resources from 
central government are spent more for recurrent expenditure due to the enlargement of 
civil service and the inefficiency of district government agencies. Low willingness of 
district government to share budget information has hindered public participation in 
budgeting process. In addition, district parliament also lacks requisite capacity to analyze 
the budget. Thus, the existing participatory budgeting just becomes a formality, and rural 
people still cannot influence the budgeting process. 
Study at village level reveals more complex situation. As discussed in Chapter 6, 
social capital exists in the study villages. This is indicated from a low portion of 
respondents, only 19%, who do not become active members in any institution. However, 
while community social relations are mostly in informal institutions, the village 
government is still monopolized by village officers, village parliament and village 
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development committee. In the name of decentralization, power and resources are 
transferred to these formal institutions  although they have only limited membership and 
access of villager to these institutions was limited. The formalization of decentralization 
has created significant barrier for community participation since the informal institutions 
are given no opportunity to enter village political arena. Not well utilized in 
decentralization, membership in informal institution just becomes a bounding social capital 
not transformed to linking social capital connecting villagers to government.  
In Chapter 7, this study finds that capacities of village government are good 
enough. Their members come from relatively better human resources within the village, 
and they have good understanding on administration tasks, regulations as well as technical 
skill to implement village budget. However, despite these good skills, weak coordination 
among them is still a major problem hampering the realization of capacity to address local 
problems. Village head is still very dominant and blocking the capacity of other 
institutions, especially village parliament and village development committee. 
Related to the issue of formalization of village government presented in Chapter 6, 
Chapter 8 of this study finds that the spirit of participatory development mandated by the 
national decentralization laws is deviated by a guide of village budget execution locally 
made by Purbalingga district. The guide does not guarantee the rights of the marginal 
groups like women and the poor as well as informal institutions to participate in village 
decision making. This has become a barrier in promoting inclusive decision-making as 
well as accountability of village budget. Thus, decentralization creates only a pseudo 
participation emphasizing more on resource mobilization but less on planning and 
evaluation. Indeed, this study finds that in Serang, community is more active in planning, 
implementation and evaluation. The better quality of community participation in this 
village is attributable to the leadership factor. 
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In Chapter 9, this study finds that at district level, positive impact of decentralization 
is found mostly in term of physical infrastructure.  At household level, most of poverty 
alleviation programs implemented within decentralized system suffer from under coverage 
due to insufficient funding. The findings in this chapter are still related to the findings in the 
Chapter 5, in which budget of rural development in Purbalingga district is low. Thus, when 
the programs are implemented in village level, they cannot cover many of the poor. Program 
of Health Insurance for the Poor (Askeskin) and Program of Poor House Renovation (PPHR) 
are the programs suffering from serious under coverage. Further, some programs distributing 
kinds in hand like Program of Rice for the Poor (Raskin) and Program of Woman Saving 
Group (PWSG) suffer from leakage because the kinds are distributed to almost all villagers. 
Despite of some miss targeting, there is no association between kinship relation with the 
village officers and this miss targeting. Thus, the miss targeting is more due to a principle of 
solidarity within rural community. Further, under coverage as well as leakage of the 
programs make them not able to achieve their objective to alleviate poverty. Only rural 
infrastructure development significantly improves access of respondents to some selected 
public service.  
 
10.2. Recommendation 
To improve the effectiveness of decentralization in rural development as well as 
poverty alleviation, it is strongly recommended for the central government to strengthen the 
legislations on decentralization. The legislations on Indonesian decentralization should set a 
minimum portion of district budget to be allocated for agriculture and rural infrastructure 
sectors. To improve the quality of public hearing in district budgeting process, the 
legislations should make compulsory for district governments to share budget information 
and to create clear-cut procedures for selecting village proposals. Further, a workload 
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analysis to determine the ideal size of district government agencies as well as the number of 
civil service is also strongly recommended, so that the structure of district government and 
their recurrent expenditure can be more efficient.  
With regard to local capacity, this study recommends the government to deliver a 
capacity development for village government, especially village parliament and village 
development committee. The content of capacity development should be directed to the 
personal empowerment of these institutions, so that they can take a more balance position 
with the village head traditionally very dominant in rural areas. It can be done through 
socialization of the regulations on decentralization and rural development and training to 
foster community participation in village governance and development planning.  
It is important to note the effort to strengthen village government capacity should not 
go alone. Capacity development for village government institutions will not automatically 
empower community because their structures have limitations to reach the community 
directly. Majority of villagers are organized in informal institutions. Thus, hand in hand with 
the capacity development for village government, the government should also empower 
community. It can be done by guaranteeing the rights of informal institutions as well as the 
marginal groups in village decision making. This study recommends to involve the informal 
institutions and marginal groups based on a logic that the more they are involved, the more 
they are empowered. Further, the more they are empowered, not only they will be more able 
to identify their problem and to solve it,  but also they will be more able to find agreement of 
various interests within community and to manage local conflict. 
With regard to the identification of beneficiaries of poverty alleviation programs, the 
central government is expected not to impose centrally set indicators of poor households 
strictly. Rather, it should provide space for application of additional local indictors set by 
rural community and village government. The application of additional local indicators of 
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poor households will fulfill the gaps when the central government indicators are not 
successful to identify the eligible households for social protections and other development 
programs. In this connection, poverty alleviation should be understood as rights-based-
development that should not exclude a poor from the development programs just because 
they do not meet an indicator set by the central government. 
At the end, although this study has tried to analyze the implementation of 
decentralization, especially those related to district budgeting, social capital, local capacity, 
community participation and poverty alleviation, there are still many limitations in this 
study. Within the framework made by this study, unfortunately, it cannot provide analysis 
more comprehensively on budget composition due to the relatively secret document. Thus, 
future studies needs to address this aspect more deeply. 
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